Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

The German 5.Panzer-Division, attacking from Rzhev, also made no progress, but the 20.Panzer-Division, attacking from the east, found a weak spot. The 373rd Rifle Division could not hold the 20.Panzer-Division and the panzers advanced rapidly, causing the 39th Army’s all-around defense to collapse. A panic ensued, allowing the 1 and 2.Panzer-Divisionen to link up on 5 July, completing the encirclement of the 39th Army. Over the next week, the Germans smashed the Soviet divisions within the kessel, and eventually took at least 30,000 prisoners and eliminated 218 Soviet tanks.⁶⁷

While the 39th Army was dying on the western side of the Rzhev salient, Zhukov assembled a mass of troops and armour on the eastern side to retake Rzhev and eliminate the 9.Armee. Konev’s Kalinin Front would attack with its 29th and 30th Armies from the north, while Zhukov’s Western Front attacked from the east with its 20th and 31st Armies. Zhukov also ensured that there would be adequate air support for the operation – two air armies – which helps to explain why the Luftwaffe was virtually unopposed in the Bolkhov-Zhizdra sectors.

Konev’s two armies attacked first, with only a few tank brigades in the infantry support role, beginning on 30 July. Yet the German infantry were well dug in north of Rzhev and Konev’s own infantry could make no real progress, despite repeated efforts. Soviet artillery preparations were still undermined by limited stockpiles of ammunition and poor fire coordination, so the level of artillery support typically dropped off sharply after the first few days of an offensive. Unable to achieve a breakthrough, Konev withheld most of his armour. Zhukov waited until 4 August, hoping that Konev could divert German reserves, then committed his 20th and 31st Armies into an attack against the northeast corner of the Rzhev salient. The two Soviet armies committed a massive amount of infantry and artillery against the Pogoreloe sector, held by the German XXXXVI Panzerkorps with 36.Infanterie-Division (mot) and the 161.Infanterie-Division. Each army had a mobile group, comprised of three tank brigades, to exploit success and Zhukov had the 6th and 8th Tank Corps as front-level exploitation forces. Zhukov had a flair for pouring overwhelming resources into a battle and he simply buried these two German front-line divisions under an avalanche of firepower. Within twenty-four hours, Zhukov’s forces had created a 30km-wide hole in 9.Armee’s front, with penetrations varying from 12–20km. Indeed, Zhukov had succeeded in achieving a breakthrough against a strongly fortified German line – a first for the Red Army. However, Zhukov did not apparently realize the scale of his victory and allowed the 20th and 31st Armies to continue to dawdle in committing their mobile groups to exploit the victory. Indeed, the Soviet offensive made clear that the concepts of mobile warfare were still not completely understood by all Red Army senior leadership, some of whom still moved at a First World War pace of operations. In a race against time, von Viettinghoff rushed kampfgruppen from the 2 and 5.Panzer-Divisionen from Vyazma to block the advance of the 20th and 31st Armies before Soviet armour appeared in quantity on the battlefield. By the end of the second day, the 20th and 31st Armies began committing their mobile groups, but German armour was already at hand to oppose them. Yet these two panzer divisions could only put about 150–180 operational tanks into the field, while Zhukov committed 600 tanks to the Pogoreloe sector and could call upon more from the RVGK. After a rapid advance of up to 20km, both Soviet assault armies slowed to a crawl and the battle became more of a pushing and shoving match, although the Red Army still maintained the upper hand.

Frustrated that neither the 20th nor 31st Armies could push through the two incomplete panzer divisions in their path or even widen the breach, Zhukov began committing his front-level mobile group on 11 August. Zhukov put his deputy, General-major Ivan V. Galanin, in command of a mobile group comprising General-major Andrei L. Getman’s 6th Tank Corps, General-major Mikhail D. Solomatin’s 8th Tank Corps and General-major Vladimir V. Kriukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. Putting an infantryman with no prior experience with mechanized operations in charge of a mixed armour-cavalry mobile group with 334 tanks was probably not a sound choice, but it mattered little since the salient formed by the 20th and 31st Armies was too small for maneuver. Instead, Galanin’s mobile group simply reinforced the army-level mobile groups and proceeded to push westward. German resistance stiffened as more reinforcements arrived, including a kampfgruppe from 1.Panzer-Division and Generaloberst Walter Model, who returned to resume command of the 9.Armee.