During the period 12–28 September, there was an intensive debate within the Stavka and GKO about planning a major counter-offensive for the autumn. In addition to Zhukov, General-polkovnik Aleksandr M. Vasilevsky, chief of the general staff, and his deputy General-leytenant Nikolai F. Vatutin, led the discussions. Zhukov, who had just returned from a two-week period at Stalingrad, recommended a major counter-offensive against the long flanks of AOK 6 along the Don. After the failed Kotluban’ offensive, he recognized that a decisive success against dug-in German troops was unlikely, but the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies were more lucrative targets. The consensus of opinion was that Soviet armour could succeed against the Romanians and that a Deep Battle attack against Paulus’ lines of communication would put AOK 6 at serious risk. Stalin approved this plan, which would be called Operation Uranus. However, Zhukov also argued that the Red Army was now strong enough to mount two major counter-offensives and, in addition to Uranus, he wanted to lead a renewed attack against AOK 9 in the Rzhev salient. Stalin agreed to Zhukov’s proposal, which was designated Operation Mars. Both counter-offensives were planned to begin sometime in October, giving several weeks for preparations.
While Zhukov focused on Operation Mars, the Stavka selected Vasilevsky to plan and organize Operation Uranus (Zhukov did remain involved as an overall supervisor). Although not widely recognized in the west, Vasilevsky was the Red Army’s best operational-level equivalent to von Manstein and a gifted staff officer. In anticipation of the importance of the new operation, the Stavka wanted its best field commanders and assigned Vatutin to take over the Southwest Front and Rokossovsky to take over the new Don Front, while Yeremenko kept the Stalingrad Front. Vasilevsky intended to conduct a double envelopment of AOK 6 at Stalingrad, using the basic principles of the pre-war Deep Battle doctrine.73
The main effort would be launched by Vatutin’s Southwest Front, with Romanenko’s 5th Tank Army attacking out of the Serafimovich bridgehead and General-leytenant Ivan M. Chistiakov’s reinforced 21st Army attacking from the Kletskaya bridgehead across the Don to strike the 3rd Romanian Army. Vatutin would send Romanenko’s 5th Tank Army due south toward the rail line at Oblivskaya while the mobile group from 21st Army advanced to the southeast to envelop AOK 6’s left flank. Altogether, Vatutin’s three tank corps and several separate tank brigades had 440 tanks, far fewer than had been committed into the Battle of the Don Bend in July. Vasilevsky based Uranus on maneuver not mass – a departure from previous Soviet counter-offensives. Rokossovsky’s Don Front would conduct supporting attacks with two armies against AOK 6’s left flank, but with only 103 tanks in 16th Tank Corps. The other half of the Soviet counter-offensive would begin a day later, when Yeremenko’s Stalingrad Front attacked the Romanian 4th Army near Lake Sarpa, south of Stalingrad. Vasilevsky intended that Operation Uranus would be marked by a high offensive tempo and, once the Romanian defensive lines were broken, the Soviet armoured units were expected to advance 30–40km per day and a link-up occur by the end of the third day.All told, the Red Army committed 1,560 tanks to Operation Uranus. In addition to the five tank corps involved in the counter-offensive, Uranus would also see the first employment of the newly-organized mechanized corps. Since the tank corps had proved quite fragile in combat, the Stavka wanted a formation with greater staying power. General-major Vasiliy T. Volskii’s 4th Mechanized Corps, formed on 18 September, had nine motorized infantry battalions and five tank battalions, for a total of 220 tanks and 6,000 infantry. While the mechanized corps was still deficient in terms of organic artillery and support units, it demonstrated that the Red Army was learning from its mistakes and evolving its force structure to make the best of its capabilities.