Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

General Petre Dumitrescu’s 3rd Romanian Army was the primary target of Operation Uranus. Dumitrescu had over 150,000 Romanian and 11,000 German troops in the II, IV and V Corps, with seven infantry and two cavalry divisions, holding a 138km-wide front along the Don. The Romanian infantry divisions were forced to hold very wide sectors, averaging 20km wide, and were very deficient in anti-tank capability – twelve 4.7cm anti-tank guns at division-level and twelve 37mm guns at regiment-level – and very limited artillery fire support. Poorly-equipped and unmotivated, the Romanian infantry’s ability to withstand large-scale enemy armoured attacks was minimal. The Germans regarded the Romanians as place-holders for their own infantry, but did not expect them to hold off large-scale Soviet offensives on their own. Recognizing the dangers of having both of AOK 6’s flanks guarded by Romanian forces, the OKH directed Heeresgruppe B to deploy armoured reserves behind them, ready to counterattack if necessary.

Generalleutnant Ferdinand Heim’s XXXXVIII Panzerkorps was deployed 40–50km behind the Romanian 3rd Army, with Generalleutnant Eberhard Rodt’s 22.Panzer-Division and the Romanian 1st Armoured Division. However, Rodt’s division was in poor condition since it had been stripped of one of its panzergrenadier regiments and its pioneer battalion, while its Panzer-Regiment 204 only had forty operational tanks (including twenty-two Pz.III and eleven Pz.IV). Although the Romanian armoured division was still equipped with eighty-seven R-2 (Pz.35(t)) light tanks, it had recently received a major shipment of German equipment, including eleven Pz.IIIN and eleven Pz.IVG tanks, and nine 5cm Pak38 and nine 7.5cm Pak40 anti-tank guns.⁷⁴ Fuel for the entire corps was in very short supply. Thus, Heim’s XXXXVIII Panzerkorps had 150 tanks, but limited ability to withstand large numbers of T-34s. Paulus did not expect a major enemy counter-offensive across the Don because German intelligence failed to identify the deployment of the 5th Tank Army, but the VIII and XI Armeekorps commanders were so nervous about Soviet front-line activity in their sectors, that he consented to send Major Bernhard Sauvant’s kampfgruppe from 14.Panzer-Division with thirty-five tanks and some panzer-grenadiers to support his left flank. Nor did German intelligence detect the 4th Mechanized Corps arriving south of Stalingrad. Soviet operational-level maskirovka (deception) played a major role in shaping the outcome of Uranus.

Operation Uranus began at 0720 hours on 19 November with a massive artillery bombardment along the Southwest and Don fronts. It was snowing, with heavy mist and a thick blanket of snow covered the ground. Visibility was very limited and the temperature was –19° C. Vasilevsky preferred to attack in poor weather because it preserved the element of surprise to the last moment and prevented interference from the Luftwaffe. Dumitrescu’s infantry were deployed in field entrenchments, so the artillery barrage was only moderately effective, but they also did not see the attacking Soviet infantry and tanks until they were within small arms range. Minefields gave the Soviets some trouble, but Romanenko’s 5th Tank Army rolled over the Romanian 9th and 14th Infantry Divisions in a matter of hours, creating a 16km-wide breach near Bolshoy. To the east, near Kletskaya, General-major Andrei G. Kravchenko’s 4th Tank Corps smashed through the Romanian 13th Infantry Division, but lost twenty-five of its 143 tanks knocked out in the minefields and obstacle belt. Chistiakov’s 21st Army made a 10km-wide breach in the Romanian lines and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps plunged into the gap, advancing 35km on the first day. Within six hours of the beginning of Uranus, Dumitrescu’s front was pierced in two places and Soviet armour and cavalry were advancing boldly into the breaches. Many Romanian troops in these two sectors panicked and either surrendered or retreated without orders, widening the Soviet breakthrough.

Heim’s XXXXVIII Panzerkorps began ‘moving to the sound of the guns’ within hours of the beginning of the Soviet offensive, but only forty-one tanks were operational and fuel limitations prevented the entire unit from moving. Instead, Kampfgruppe Oppeln was formed and dispatched toward Bolshoy. Coordination between XXXXVIII Panzerkorps and Heeresgruppe B, the Romanian 3rd Army or AOK 6 was virtually non-existent, so Heim was committing the sole armoured reserve into an unknown situation. Instead of advancing together, the Romanian 1st Armoured Division advanced due north, while Kampfgruppe Oppeln went to the northwest. It was already dark by 1700 hours, when the German armoured column bumped into a group of tanks from General-major Vasiliy V. Butkov’s 1st Tank Corps near Petshany. A wild shoot-out occurred at close range, in the swirling snow and darkness, and the Germans were not the victor.