Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

In combat, only about one-quarter of tanks hit by enemy action actually caught fire and burned out. Both sides tended to claim every enemy tank hit as a ‘kill’, but a good percentage of hits either bounced off the armour or failed to penetrate. Based upon post-battle analysis of both sides’ records, the Germans appear to have often exaggerated their tank ‘kills’ by up to 200 per cent and the Soviets by 500 per cent. Even those tanks that were considered ‘knocked out’ could often be repaired, since the damage inflicted by armour-piercing ammunition was usually not catastrophic. Crew casualties were usually limited to 0–2 fatalities per tank knocked out, with the rest of the crew wounded, so it was not unusual for a given crew to have been knocked out several times during the course of the war. In the early years of the war, Soviet tankers often abandoned their tanks if hit, and simply walked back to their own lines. The Red Army eventually issued a directive that tank crews that returned to their lines without their tanks would be sent to penal units, which forced Soviet tankers to stick with their damaged vehicles.

Overview – disposition of major German and Soviet armoured units at start of Barbarossa, 22 June 1941 and major battle sites, limit of German advance.

Chapter 1 The Opposing Armoured Forces in 1941

The German Panzerwaffe

The Wehrmacht initially deployed seventeen panzer divisions against the Soviet Union, organized into four Panzergruppen.¹ Nine of the panzer divisions were less than a year old, having been formed from other existing infantry units between August and November 1940, when Hitler decided to double the number of panzer divisions. In practical terms, this meant that nearly half the panzer divisions involved in Barbarossa had no previous campaign experience in their current role. Nor was the internal structure of the panzer divisions uniform: eight were organized with two panzer battalions and nine divisions had three panzer battalions. The Panzergruppen were further divided into ten Armeekorps (mot.), later redesignated in early 1942 as Panzerkorps, with each controlling up to two panzer divisions and up to two motorized infantry units. The Panzergruppe (or Panzerarmee after October 1941) would be the primary German operational-level armoured formation of 1941–42, while the Panzerkorps would be the primary tactical-level formation.² Previous campaigns had taught the Wehrmacht the value of concentrating armour, so it was rare for individual panzer divisions, brigades or regiments to operate independently in the first year of the war in the East.

The bulk of the Panzerwaffe was massed with Heeresgruppe Mitte in the center, with Generaloberst Heinz Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 and Generaloberst Hermann Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3. These two Panzergruppen had nine panzer divisions with a total of 1,786 tanks, or 57 per cent of the total available for Barbarossa. Guderian, who had fought so hard to promote the concept of an independent panzer branch before the war, now used the credibility that he gained as a corps commander in Poland and France to ensure that he was given the strongest panzer divisions for Operation Barbarossa. Panzergruppe Guderian would start the campaign with nearly 1,000 tanks in thirteen panzer battalions and all five of his divisions were fully equipped with Pz.III medium tanks. In contrast, Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3 had a total of twelve panzer battalions in four panzer divisions, none of which were equipped with Pz.III medium tanks. Instead, Hoth was provided with 507 Czech-made Pz.38(t) light tanks, equipped with the 3.7cm Skoda A7 cannon. The Pz.38(t) tanks were still in production by BMM in Prague and had better mobility than the Pz.III Aus F/G models, but significantly less armour and firepower. Indeed, Hoth’s Panzergruppe was primarily configured as a pursuit force and had negligible anti-armour capability.

Generaloberst Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 (Heeresgruppe Mitte)

Generaloberst Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3 (Heeresgruppe Mitte)