Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

German operational and tactical-level panzer doctrine incorporated elements of the Stosstruppen tactics of 1918, with a preference for infiltration and encirclement, rather than costly, frontal attacks. The Germans also learned first-hand in the streets of Warsaw on 8 September 1939 that panzer divisions fared poorly in cities, although this lesson would often be ignored during the Russo-German War. Instead, the panzer divisions were intended to create a breach in the enemy front on favorable terrain – with help from infantry, artillery and the Luftwaffe – and then advance rapidly to encircle the enemy’s main body before they could react. The panzers would push boldly ahead of the non-motorized infantry divisions, who would have to rely upon assault-gun batteries for close support in completing the breakthrough battle. German doctrine assumed that once enemy units were encircled in a kessel, that they would either quickly surrender or be annihilated with concentric attacks. The doctrinal preference was to use pairs of panzer divisions or corps to encircle an enemy with double envelopments, rather than the riskier single-envelopment approach. Thus, the German doctrinal solution to the Red Army was to conduct successive battles of encirclement until the best Soviet units were demolished.

However, the doctrine employed by the German Panzerwaffe had two primary flaws, which had not appeared in previous campaigns. First, the Germans could not logistically sustain a series of panzer encirclements indefinitely; eventually fuel shortages and mechanical defects would bring the advance to a halt and that might give the enemy a chance to recover. Second, the doctrine was developed at a time when anti-tank defenses were relatively weak, which enabled panzer divisions to run roughshod over most infantry divisions caught in open terrain. Yet as Soviet anti-tank defenses steadily improved in 1942–43, German panzer leaders continued to believe that enemy infantry could not stop an envelopment from occurring.

The men leading the panzers into the Soviet Union were a well-trained and professional cadre, but nearly one-third had little or no direct experience with tanks. Indeed, many German senior armour leaders in 1941 were still learning their trade and not completely aware of the capabilities and limitations of tanks. Half of the top thirty-one panzer leaders came from the infantry branch and one-third from the cavalry. At the most senior level, Generaloberst Ewald von Kleist of Panzergruppe 1 had more experience with commanding large panzer formations than any other officer in any army, although he had never actually served in a panzer unit. Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, commander of Panzergruppe 2, had commanded a panzer division and led his motorized corps in Poland and France, but was the only non-combat arms officer in command of panzer units in Operation Barbarossa. As a signal corps officer turned mechanization advocate, Guderian remained something of a dilettante throughout his career and had the impulsive, undisciplined nature of a military maverick – he was not a team player, but an individualist. Six of the ten commanders of motorized corps in June 1941 had previous battle command experience with a corps, but three – including General der Infanterie Erich von Manstein – had no personal experience with panzer units. Only three panzer corps commanders: General der Panzertruppen Georg-Hans Reinhardt, General der Panzertruppen Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg and General der Panzertruppe Rudolf Schmidt had both extensive corps command experience and had previously led a panzer division in battle. Hitler’s creation of ten new panzer divisions in late 1940 diluted the division leadership pool somewhat and, by the start of Barbarossa, only eight of the seventeen panzer division commanders had previous division command experience and five of the seventeen were new to the Panzerwaffe. A number of the new panzer division commanders, such as Generalleutnant Walter Model, had primarily been staff officers with limited command experience. The German officers tended to be older than their Soviet counterparts due to Stalin’s purge of the Red Army, with the average age of the top thirty-one panzer commanders being fifty-three.