Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

The Pz.IV medium tanks, armed with the 7.5cm KwK 37 L/24 howitzer, were armed with a mix of fifty-two high explosive rounds, twenty-one armour-piercing rounds (k.Gr.rot.Pz. (APC) or Panzergranate) and seven smoke rounds at the start of Barbarossa.⁵ While the 7.5cm k.Gr.rot.Pz. round could penetrate up to 39mm of armour at 500 meters, its low velocity made it poorly-suited for anti-tank combat against T-34 or KV tanks. In an effort to improve firepower, the Germans were developing a new type of High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds for the 7.5cm howitzers on Pz.IVs and StuG III assault guns, but they would not be available until the end of 1941. In actuality, both the Pz.IV and StuG III were only suited for the infantry support role in 1941, leaving the Pz.III as the sole effective dual-purpose tank employed by the Panzerwaffe in Barbarossa. In addition to the panzers, the Wehrmacht deployed twelve Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung with over 200 StuG III assault guns and five Army-Level Panzerjäger-Abteilung equipped with 135 Panzerjäger I tank destroyers. The Panzerjäger I was an improvisation, with the high-velocity Czech-made 4.7cm cannon mounted atop an obsolete Pz.I chassis; the 4.7cm was one of the best anti-tank weapons available to the Wehrmacht at the start of Barbarossa.

Nearly one-quarter of the German battle tanks heading into the Soviet Union were Pz.II light tanks, which were already obsolescent in the previous French campaign. Unlike the Pz.I, the Pz.II still played a major role in German tank platoons and companies. Although often used as a scouting tank, the Pz.II tank had better armoured protection than either the T-26 or BT-series light tanks and its rapid-firing 2cm KwK 30 cannon could penetrate their armour at ranges under 500 meters. The Pz.II would also play a useful role in escorting supply convoys through forested areas infested with Soviet partisans.

Despite much media publicity about Germany’s so-called Blitzkrieg doctrine both during and after the war – which was intended to create the impression of short, successful campaigns – the Panzerwaffe had a relatively amorphous doctrine in 1941. One of the key components of this doctrine was a preference for combined-arms tactics in mixed kampfgruppen; tank-pure tactics were rejected as foolhardy and inefficient. As an example, the 4.Panzer-Division’s Kampfgruppe Eberbach in early July 1941 was comprised of one Panzer-Abteilung, one Kradschützen Kompanie (motorcycle infantry), a Schützen Kompanie (Mechanized Infantry) in SPW half tracks, an artillery battalion (twelve towed 10.5-cm howitzers), two Pioneer Kompanie, part of a Brückenkolonne, one heavy flak battery (8.8cm) and one light flak battery (2cm). All told, Kampfgruppe Eberbach started with about 2,300 troops and 750 vehicles. Other variations included Panzerjäger and Aufklärungs (reconnaissance troops), as well as more infantry. Each panzer division would normally form three kampfgruppen, usually one that was tank-heavy and two that were infantry-heavy.

Another key component of the German doctrine was extensive use of radios in tactical vehicles to ensure effective command and control. German panzer units operated company, battalion, regiment and division-level radio networks, which enabled timely sharing of combat information and provided German commanders with excellent situational awareness. Using the Medium Frequency (MF) Fu-8 or Very High Frequency (VHF) Fu-6 radios mounted on a Panzerbefehlswagen III (armoured command vehicle) or a Sd.Kfz.250/3 half track, a German panzer kampfgruppe commander could exercise command over a 40km radius while moving and up to 70km while stationary. German panzer platoon and company radio nets relied upon the VHF Fu-2 and Fu-5 radios, with a 2–4km radius of control. The mounting of radios in every panzer allowed the Germans to get the most out of their available armour and mass it where it was needed most.

Furthermore, the use of the Enigma encryption device gave the Germans a secure means of communicating orders between divisions, corps and armies. Although German panzer units lacked direct air-ground communications with Luftwaffe units in June 1941, requests for air support could be passed from forward kampfgruppen up through the division radio net in a reasonable period of time.