Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

The Stavka had assigned General-polkovnik Konstantin K. Rokossovsky’s Don Front the honour of destroying the trapped 6.Armee in Stalingrad, while the South and Southwest Fronts dealt with von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe Don. Rokossovsky’s ramshackle command included seven different-numbered armies whose subordinate units included 281,000 troops in 35 rifle divisions and 13 rifle brigades. Rokossovsky’s infantry was worn out after months of fighting in Stalingrad, with most units reduced to 40–60 strength. Likewise, the Don Front’s armoured strength was modest, since most of the available armour had gone to support the flanking attacks against the Romanians in November, then to stop the German relief effort in December. Rokossovsky had just four tank brigades, four tank regiments and one OTB, with barely 100 operational tanks spread across seven armies. In addition, the Don Front’s logistic situation was only slightly better than that of the trapped 6.Armee, with infantrymen and tankers in forward areas subsisting on minimal rations. Consequently, the Don Front did not have a significant numerical superiority over the 6.Armee and the depleted condition of Rokossovsky’s forces suggested a protracted battle of attrition to finish off Paulus’ army.

Marshal of Artillery Nikolai N. Voronov, the commander of the Red Army’s artillery, was sent as Stavka representative to the Don Front to help plan Operation Koltso (Ring), intended to begin on 10 January 1943. In order to reinforce Rokossovsky’s Don Front for Operation Koltso, Voronov brought in about 30,000 infantry replacements as well as a large number of artillery units as reinforcements. The 11th Artillery Division was assigned to the Don Front, adding over 300 guns/heavy mortars and 16 multiple rocket launchers to Rokossovsky’s arsenal. In addition, the Stavka sent 10 independent guards breakthrough tank regiments with 110 KV-1S heavy tanks and 21 Lend-Lease Churchill tanks to the Don Front to participate in Operation Koltso. However, Voronov planned Operation Koltso primarily as an artillery offensive, with infantry-armour shock groups only attacking once the German defences were thoroughly smashed. Don Front’s main effort would be made against the western side of the pocket with the 21st, 24th and 65th Armies, while the 57th and 65th Armies made a supporting attack against the southern side of the pocket. Voronov confidently expected that Koltso would collapse the pocket in just four days. Yet it is clear that the Stavka greatly underestimated the residual combat power of the 6.Armee and failed to provide Rokossovsky with enough resources to achieve a quick victory.

While building up to Operation Koltso, Rokossovsky’s Don Front limited themselves to mostly reconnaissance and raiding activity on 1–5 January, but on 6 January they began mounting a series of local attacks on the northern and western sides of the pocket. On 7 January, the Soviet 65th Army mounted a two rifle division attack against the German 44.Infanterie-Division on the western side of the pocket and succeeded in penetrating its defensive line (HKL) and inflicting significant casualties. In response, the VIII Armeekorps committed 24 tanks and a number of assault guns to contain the Soviet breakthrough, which exposed these units to concentrated Soviet artillery fire. Not only did the commitment of German armour fail to restore the former frontline in this sector, but it consumed fuel and ammunition for no gain. One of the cardinal rules of defence is not to commit one’s reserves prematurely, and Paulus had allowed a substantial part of his armour in the western sector of the pocket to be committed before the main Soviet offensive had even begun. The simple fact was that 6.Armee was trying to hold too much terrain with too few troops and the only logical solution was to withdraw into a tighter perimeter, but Hitler would not accept even modest tactical adjustments at this point of a losing battle.