By 15 January, the 6.Armee had contracted into a much tighter perimeter closer to Stalingrad, but was forced to hold the outlying areas around Pitomnik and Gumrak airfields. Yet since Hube’s XIV Panzerkorps was combat ineffective after five days of fighting, Paulus no longer had the means to defend the airfields. Almost all of the German tanks and assault guns were either knocked out or immobilized by lack of fuel, although Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 243 still had two StuG IIIs defending Pitomnik and Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 245 had a few at Gumrak. Hauptmann Haen from Panzer-Abteilung 103 had been badly wounded in action on 13 January but he was fortunate enough to be flown out on 15 January; those panzer crewmen still on their feet were turned into infantrymen.[3]
Nearly one-third of 6.Armee’s personnel had become casualties in five days of fighting, leaving fewer than 20,000 combat troops to hold the shrinking perimeter. Rokossovsky had hoped to split the German pocket into several easily-digestible sub-groups, but instead the 65th Army’s attacks from the west and the 57th Army’s attacks from south merely herded the 6.Armee in closer to Stalingrad. With only about 100 tanks still in operation, Rokossovsky used his armour in small groups to help his infantry mop up various GermanOn 16 January, infantrymen from the 51st Army overran Pitomnik airfield. After this, the battle began to slow down as Rokossovsky shifted toward more deliberate tactics, relying upon his superior artillery to decide the issue. The Don Front’s remaining 110 tanks were reduced to a secondary role by this point and the German armour was essentially out of the battle. From 18–21 January, Rokossovsky paused his offensive in order to bring up his artillery and replenish his combat units, knowing that he could afford this luxury since Paulus could not replace any of his losses. The Luftwaffe’s aerial resupply effort was reduced to a pitiful average of 86 tons per day; German soldiers were already starving to death and the last few German tanks were now immobilized by lack of fuel. On the morning of 22 January, Rokossovsky resumed his offensive and Gumrak fell the next day, which forced the Luftwaffe to resort to parachuting in a token amount of supplies each day. After that, the Don Front slowly pummelled the 6.Armee into submission, with Paulus surrendering on 31 January. The last German troops in Stalingrad surrendered on 2 February.
Stalingrad was a debacle for the German Panzertruppe and Sturmartillerie, removing three Panzer-Divisionen and three motorized infantry divisions with a total of 12 Panzer-Abteilungen, as well as four Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen from the Heer order of battle. Although the loss of hundreds of tanks and assault guns was serious, they could be replaced. However, the loss of more than 5,000 veteran tankers and Sturmartillerie crewmen was grievous. Some panzer crewmen, mostly wounded like Haen and Oberst Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz, had been flown out. Major Willy Langkeit, commander of the II./Panzer-Regiment 36, was one of the few able-bodied tankers flown out of the pocket and he would be instrumental in rebuilding Panzer-Regiment 36. Hitler also intervened to save a few select senior officers, such as General der Panzertruppe Hube and four infantry division commanders. However, Hitler did not order the evacuation of any of the three Panzer-Divisionen commanders; Lattman from 14.Panzer-Division and von Lenski from 24.Panzer-Division both went into Soviet captivity and later collaborated with the anti-Nazi League of German Officers (BDO). Generalleutnant Günther von Angern, commander of the 16.Panzer-Division, committed suicide on 2 February 1943.
Hoth’s Stand on the Manych River, 1–31 January 1943