At the start of January 1943, Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe Don was in retreat and barely able to hold a coherent front. Manstein’s strongest formation was Generaloberst Hermann Hoth’s 4.Panzerarmee (PzAOK 4), which consisted merely of the LVII Panzerkorps, part of a Luftwaffe field division and the remnants of the Romanian 4th Army. Nevertheless, General der Panzertruppe Friedrich Kirchner’s LVII Panzerkorps possessed the 17. and 23.Panzer-Divisionen, the 16.Infanterie-Division (mot.) and Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 203 and SS-Panzergrenadier-Division
Manstein’s situation was grim, but he was about to receive some significant reinforcements in the shape of the rebuilt 7.Panzer-Division (156 tanks) just arriving from France and 2./s. Panzer-Abteilung 502 and 1., 2./s. Panzer-Abteilung 503 inbound with a total of 29 Tiger tanks and 35 Pz III Ausf N tanks. Obviously, German doctrine dictated that committing all these reinforcements in one sector would yield the most decisive results, but von Manstein was in a dilemma since he was facing crises in both Hollidt’s and Hoth’s sectors. He decided to split the reinforcements, sending all the Tigers to assist Hoth and 7.Panzer-Division to assist Hollidt.
By New Year’s day, the first Tiger tanks were unloading at the rail station at Proletarskaya, just north of the Manych River. At that point, Kirchner’s LVII Panzerkorps had established a thin screen with 17. and 23.Panzer-Divisionen and a Kampfgruppe from 16.Infanterie-Division (mot.) 75km to the northeast near Zimovniki, where 4.Panzerarmee quartermasters had established a supply dump. Although the rail line to Zimovniki was not really secure, some trains with replacement tanks and vehicles for Kirchner’s corps were allowed to proceed there. The SS-