Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Since the Stavka was in a rush to kick off the offensive before the spring thaw began or the Germans restored their frontline, Rokossovsky was given only six days to plan his offensive. Furthermore, transportation difficulties delayed the redeployment of his troops from Stalingrad to Voronezh; the Soviets were having difficulty repairing rail lines and Rokossovsky’s armies only had one single-track line to support his new Central Front. Consequently, the Stavka decided to postpone Rokossovsky’s offensive until late February, while beginning on schedule with those forces from the Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts already in place. This approach caught the Germans off guard. General-leytenant Nikolai P. Pukhov’s 13th Army (Bryansk Front) attacked Schmidt’s 2.PzAOK and captured the important town of Fatezh on 12 February, while General-leytenant Ivan D. Cherniakhovsky’s 60th Army (Voronezh Front) pushed Schneider’s 4.Panzer-Division out of Kursk.⁶⁰ During the fighting for Kursk, the 4.Panzer-Division lost a number of veteran panzer junior officers and NCOs, fighting on foot as infantry. By mid-February, a 60km-wide gap had been created between 2.PzAOK and 2.AOK by these limited offensives, thereby providing the perfect prequel to Rokossovsky’s major offensive. Pukhov was particularly aggressive and continued attacking the XXXXVI Panzerkorps, seized Maloarkhangel’sk on 23 February and attracted German reserves to his sector.

However, the transportation difficulties severely impacted the deployment of Rokossovsky’s Central Front and he was forced to begin his offensive on 25 February with only part of his forces in place. Pre-battle preparations were minimal and the weather turned rainy, just as the operation was beginning. Initially, Rokossovsky attacked Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Panzerkorps with three rifle divisions from the 65th Army on his right flank and two rifle divisions attached to Rodin’s 2TA on his left. Rodin’s 11th and 16th Tank Corps, as well as the four cavalry divisions of General-major Vladimir V. Kriukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (2GCC), were kept in second echelon. Lemelsen could not hold off five Soviet rifle divisions with his two divisions and conducted a tactical delay, while calling for reinforcements. The 707.Infanterie-Division fell back a bit to occupy the fortified town of Dmitriyev-L’govsk, which was located behind the marshy Svapa River and proved to be a tough nut to crack. Rokossovsky decided to split Rodin’s 2TA, sending the 11th Tank Corps and Kriukov’s 2GCC to the west into the gap between the two German armies, but he sent General-major Aleksei G. Maslov’s 16th Tank Corps to support the drive northward into the Orel salient. Rather than concentrate his armour, Rokossovsky dissipated it by sending it on two diverging axes.⁶¹

The 707.Infanterie-Division held Dmitriyev-L’govsk long enough for the 78.Infanterie-Division to arrive and slow the Soviet advance. Batov’s 65th Army enjoyed success and was reinforced by General-major German F. Tarasov’s 70th Army; together, these two infantry armies pushed back XXXXVI Panzerkorps and successfully tied down elements of three German Panzer-Divisionen. However, the 2.PzAOK’s front south of Orel did not break and efforts by the Western Front to attack the 2.PzAOK’s front north of Orel came to naught, so the Stavka’s concept of crushing the Orel salient with a pincer attack proved unworkable at this time. Furthermore, the 16th Tank Corps was being misused in a positional battle as an infantry support unit, not as an exploitation force. Thus, the outcome of the offensive hinged on Rodin’s advance westward toward the Desna.