Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

By 1 March, Rodin was advancing westward with the 11th Tank Corps, the 2GCC and four supporting rifle brigades. There were virtually no enemy forces between his vanguard and the Desna River. The important city of Sevsk was held by only a single German infantry battalion, which was driven out by Soviet tanks and cavalry. Three intact Hungarian units – the 102, 105 and 108 Light Infantry Divisions – were deployed on the approaches to the Desna, but these formations were only trained and equipped to fight partisans in the forests, not to stop a tank army. Rodin’s forces pushed into this void, against minimal resistance, but progress was slow due to rain, poor roads and limited logistical support. On 4 March, General-major Ivan G. Lazarev’s 11th Tank Corps captured the important road junction of Seredina Buda from the hapless Hungarian 108th Light Infantry Division. On 7 March, Kriukov’s cavalry reached the Desna River near Novgorod-Seversk. However, the impact of von Manstein’s success against Vatutin’s Southwest Front and the elimination of Rybalko’s 3TA caused the Stavka to reconsider Rokossovsky’s offensive just as it was on the verge of achieving a major success. Reserves and supplies that had been allocated to Rokossovsky’s offensive were instead diverted to Golikov’s tottering Voronezh Front and the Stavka directed the Central Front to change Rodin’s axis of advance from west to north, pivoting 90 degrees. Rather than going deep for Bryansk, the Stavka opted to reduce the scale of Rokossovsky’s offensive by simply chipping away at the Orel salient as much as possible.

Under the new guidance from Moscow, Lazarev’s 11th Tank Corps turned northward while Kriukov’s 2GCC screened the front along the Desna. However, von Kluge’s Heeresgruppe Mitte was reacting to the Soviet offensive now, transferring two infantry divisions to stop the Soviet 65th and 70th Armies south of Orel and 4.Panzer-Division to counter Rodin’s 2TA. Generalmajor Erich Schneider’s 4.Panzer-Division had been reinforced with five new Pz IV Ausf G, 27 Marder IIs and some assault guns and then sent to Novgorod-Seversk, where 2.AOK still had a small bridgehead over the Desna.⁶² Just after Lazarev’s tank corps had left this sector, Schneider attacked with his Panzers on 8 March and began rolling up Kriukov’s over-extended cavalry. One Soviet-held village after another was softened up by artillery, then stormed by tanks and infantry. Schnieder led his division up-front, from a Sd. Kfz. 251 command track. By mid-March, 2.AOK contributed two more infantry divisions to this counter-attack and Kriukov’s corps was forced to retreat, thereby exposing Rodin’s 2TA to envelopment. On 19 March, the 4. Panzer-Division had advanced 97km eastward and re-captured Sevsk. Although Schneider’s Panzer-Division only captured 420 prisoners during the course of its counter-attack, parts of Kriukov’s 2GCC were cut off and isolated in the forests along the Desna, south of Bryansk.⁶³ The loss of Sevsk forced Rokossovsky to call off his sputtering offensive, unable to break the German defences south of Orel or to deal with the counter-attack of a single Panzer-Division.

The poor performance of Rodin’s 2TA in Rokossovsky’s offensive was particularly evident. In three weeks of fighting, neither of his two tank corps advanced more than 45km, captured a significant objective or destroyed any Axis units. Given the large Soviet armoured superiority in this sector and the vulnerability of third-string German formations like the 707.Infanterie-Division, as well as the Hungarian light infantry divisions, this is remarkable. In this operation, numerical superiority did not equate to victory for Rokossovsky. While Rodin’s 2TA survived the operation more or less intact, it also failed to accomplish anything worthy of a tank army.

The Soviet Offensive in the Kuban, 4 April–7 June 1943