Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

How did the armoured units and tankers on both sides use this unusual three-month ‘quiet’ period in April–June 1943? As much as possible, tank units on both sides were pulled back from the front line in order to conduct maintenance and rest crews, but they were still within range of harassing artillery fire and occasional air attacks. Typically, armoured units dispersed, with each tank company being assigned a reconstitution area in or near a small village. Upon arrival, tanks were camouflaged and troops were given rest time after basic maintenance was completed. When possible, worn track blocks and road wheels were replaced and there were always air filters to clean. Unteroffizier Erich Hager, a Pz IV crewmen in the II./Pz. Rgt. 39 in 17.Panzer-Division, kept a detailed war diary and noted a variety of activities during the lull. Like many front-line soldiers, once the action stopped thoughts turned to alcohol, sex and rest, in that order. Hager noted on 25 April, that ‘provisions arrive. We get thoroughly drunk. Otherwise nothing happens.’ The unit lived in tents in the field near a village and had sufficient ‘down time’ to play soccer games on the steppe and go swimming in local streams. Later, Hager and his comrades were able to gain some R&R (rest and recreation) time in Kharkov and spent it skirt-chasing and bar-hopping. While some soldiers were granted home leave during this period, Hager was assigned to take driver training (earning his Class 1 licence) and radio operator training.⁷¹ Surprisingly, the Germans conducted relatively little large-scale training, although company-and battalion-level training did occur. The spring rainy period lasted from 18–30 May, rendering large-scale training difficult. Soviet tankers had much less time for R&R and their brigade political officers filled most spare moments with field lectures.

While front-line tankers rested and hunted for diversions, the senior leadership on both sides planned their next major moves for the summer of 1943. Hitler had ordered the OKH to begin planning for a new summer offensive even before von Manstein had recovered Kharkov and Belgorod. On 13 March, he had the OKH issue a warning order to both Heeresgruppe Mitte and Heeresgruppe Süd to prepare for a pincer attack to eliminate the Kursk salient once the spring rasputitsa (mud) period had ended in late April.⁷² On paper, the Soviet-held Kursk salient appeared a tempting target for an easy victory that could restore German morale after the Stalingrad debacle. Von Manstein was very much in favour of a large-scale offensive against the Kursk salient and pressed for this option. After rejecting the idea of limited offensives on other parts of the Eastern Front as unlikely to be decisive, Hitler settled on the Kursk salient as the primary operational objective for the summer of 1943. On 11 April, the OKH presented the first draft of a plan for mounting a double pincer attack on the Kursk salient, known as Zitadelle. In the operations order issued four days later, Hitler stated that he wanted the offensive to begin ‘as soon as the weather permits’ and that he wanted ‘the best units, the best weapons, the best leaders and great quantities of munitions… to be focused at the Schwerpunkt.’ Clearly, Hitler intended to repeat the methods of 1941–42 at Kursk and hoped to achieve the same kind of outcome as in previous Blitzkrieg offensives.