Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

In addition to new tanks and tank destroyers, a total of 78 Wespe (10.5cm) and 54 Hummel (15cm) self-propelled howitzers were sent to reinforce the artillery regiments in the Panzer-Divisionen; this German move toward self-propelled artillery in their panzer units provided a major increase in tactical fire support. Both the Wespe and the Hummel would see their combat debut at Kursk. However, only the three Waffen-SS divisions and Großdeutschland received the full allocation of 12 Wespe and six Hummel each.⁷⁷ In AOK 9, only the 2. and 4.Panzer-Divisionen received their new howitzers. The situation was much the same with tracked and wheeled vehicles, which were essential for conducting mobile operations. The 15 mechanized divisions involved in Zitadelle had over 1,100 SPW halftracks to transport their Panzergrenadiers, but two-thirds of them belonged to von Manstein’s forces. Only three of Model’s six Panzer-Divisionen had a full Panzergrenadier Bataillon equipped with SPWs, the other three divisions either had one company or none. Losses of trucks and unarmoured halftracks during the retreats of January–March 1943 had been horrendous and not easily replaced. While the introduction of the highly-mobile Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO) tracked vehicles was a welcome addition, a number of Panzer-Divisionen were beginning to use Panje horses and carts for moving supplies; for example, the 18.Panzer-Division only had 68 per cent of its authorized motor vehicles, so it was given 1,900 horses to make up the transport deficit. The demotorization of the German forces in the East was beginning.

Von Manstein intended to mount his part of Zitadelle with Hoth’s 4.PzAOK (II. SS-Panzerkorps and XXXXVIII. Panzerkorps) and Armeeabteilung Kempf (III. Panzerkorps), which were already in place near Belgorod. His concept was essentially to blast a path through the Voronezh Front with three broad panzer wedges, supported by copious amounts of artillery and air support; it was more Verdun 1916 than Blitzkrieg 1940–41. Conscious that the Red Army might launch a spoiling attack on the Mius River to distract him from Zitadelle, von Manstein decided to leave von Mackensen’s 1.PzAOK to cover that sector with the XXIV. and XXXX. Panzerkorps, but he gave it an on-order mission to provide one of its Panzerkorps to support Hoth, if necessary. In the wake of Rokossovsky’s failed February–March offensive, von Kluge had difficulty stitching together a new front between 2.PzAOK and 2.AOK and had no forces left to mount a major offensive toward Kursk. Consequently, the OKH directed Model’s 9.AOK, which had just evacuated the Rzhev salient, to move to the southern side of the Orel salient and prepare to mount the northern pincer of Zitadelle. Model quickly recognized the difficulty of conducting a deliberate breakthrough offensive against Rokossovsky’s Central Front with his depleted units and he only fielded one relatively full-strength Panzerkorps – Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Panzerkorps). Instead, Model decided to rely heavily upon infantry and assault guns to break through Rokossovsky’s front, while keeping most of his panzers in reserve. Consequently, von Manstein and Model intended to conduct Zitadelle with very different tactics, one relying upon an armour-heavy approach and the other upon an infantry-support approach.

Table 2:

Allocation of German armour for Zitadelle

Although Zitadelle was to be the first deliberate German offensive in a year, neither army group was able to assemble the logistical resources to maintain a protracted offensive as in 1941–42. According to the OKH Zitadelle plan, both AOK 9 and Hoth’s PzAOK 4 were supposed to have enough supplies to enable 18 days of sustained operations. Yet even by 4 July, Model’s AOK 9 never had more than 20 per cent of the required fuel and 40 per cent of the required ammunition, and PzAOK 4 was only moderately better supplied. Most panzer units had 2–3 basic loads of ammunition and 5 V.S. of fuel, essentially enough for one week of fighting. After that, both army groups would be unable to operate with more than a few mobile divisions at a time.