Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Of course, everyone wanted the new Panther medium tank, but June ended and not one had yet arrived. Where were they? After three prototypes were delivered on 11 January, limited production of the Panther Ausf D model began at MAN in Nurnberg, Daimler-Benz in Berlin and MNH in Hannover. Once preparations for Zitadelle began, Hitler ordered that at least 250 Panthers would be combat-ready by 12 May. However, the first prototype Panthers had barely begun testing at Grafenwöhr when it became clear that the design was riddled with serious defects. The main problem with the Panther design was caused by Hitler’s decision in 1942 to increase its armour protection to 80mm, which raised the tank’s weight from 36 to 45 tons. MAN had not designed the transmission and final drives for a 45-ton vehicle and the rush to production had not left time to correct this defect; the early production models proved sluggish and tended to sheer teeth off the drive sprocket. Nor could the Panther move in reverse with its under-powered final drive. Nevertheless, two battalions – Panzer-Abteilungen 51 and 52 – began converting to the Panther at Erlangen, near Grafenwöhr.[16] Speer came to watch the Panzer-Abteilung 51 in manoeuvre training at Grafenwöhr on 22 February and was stunned when six of the 13 Panthers involved suffered mechanical break-downs. German tankers quickly noticed significant faults in the Panther’s turret and fuel pumps, as well as the engine’s tendency to overheat and then catch fire. Speer concluded that the poorly-engineered Panther needed significant redesign and in April the initial production batch of 250 Ausf D models went back to the MAN factory for reconstruction. Speer’s decision ultimately saved the Panther project, but the two battalions at Erlangen were left with no Panthers to train on for some time. Prior to Zitadelle, neither battalion conducted collective training with the Panther above the platoon level, nor had most crews progressed beyond familiarization before they were sent to the Eastern Front. Nor were any training materials, like the famous Panther-Fibel, yet available. With the pressure building from Hitler and the OKH to get the Panthers to the front as soon as possible, the technical fixes were rushed and the crews were only partly trained. When the rebuilt Panthers were issued in June, Guderian inspected them and found that, ‘the track suspension and drive were not right, and the optics were also not yet satisfactory.’⁷⁵ Guderian informed Hitler on 16 June that the Panther was not ready for combat, but his sound technical analysis of the Panther’s faults was rejected by Speer’s assistant, Karl-Otto Saur. Many of the recommended improvements would go into the next version of the Panther, the Ausf A model, but that would not be available until well after Zitadelle. In the meantime, the Heer was stuck with the problematic Panther Ausf D. Both battalions were rail-loaded at Erlangen in late June and spent a week heading eastward, before arriving near Borisovka the day before Zitadelle began. Ominously, the two battalions suffered 10 per cent mechanical losses just in the short road march from the rail head to their tactical assembly areas, including two Panthers burnt out. Even worse, Major Karl von Sivers, an experienced tanker who was supposed to command Panzer-Abteilung 52, fell ill just before the unit went east, forcing a last-minute substitution.

Originally, the OKH had intended to give one Panther battalion each to Heeresgruppe Mitte and Heeresgruppe Süd, but in the end von Manstein received both. Indeed, the bulk of the new armour and personnel replacements went to von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe Mitte (see Table 2). None of Model’s six Panzer-Divisionen had more than a single Panzer-Abteilung, whereas five of von Manstein’s divisions had two Panzer-Abteilungen each.[17] In Model’s 9.Armee, only the 2. and 4.Panzer-Divisionen were brought back up to near authorized strength. Even after the three-month lull, many tanks were still inoperative awaiting spare parts, and the overall operational readiness rate for German tanks on the Eastern Front was 89 per cent. Of course, that meant 11 per cent, or 466 tanks, were still non-operational after months without combat.⁷⁶