Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Meanwhile, Grechko continued attacking Rupp’s defensive positions from 29 April–4 May and committed 60 tanks on one day, as well as massive air support. Luftflotte 4 made a major effort to gain air superiority over the Krymskaya sector, inflicting painful losses on the 4VA, but could not stop the incessant Soviet bombing and low-level attacks. Finally, Rupp was forced to abandon Krymskaya and pull his HKL back west of the city. However, the new German line was just as solid and Maslennikov had to pause to reinforce the 56th Army and prepare for a larger set-piece offensive. Disappointed by Maslennikov’s failure to achieve a breakthrough, the Stavka decided to replace him with General Ivan E. Petrov, who had conducted the unsuccessful defence of Sevastopol in 1942. The Stavka also provided the 1448th and 1449th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiments (SAP), equipped with Su-76 and Su-122 guns, to spearhead a new offensive. Petrov decided to shift his attack axis northward, to make the main effort against the 101.Jäger-Division with the 37th Army this time, while Grechko made a supporting attack against Rupp. On 26 May, Petrov’s Front began a 100-minute artillery preparation. However, the Soviet infantry was unable to penetrate the Blue Line and when the Soviet armour (a mix of T-34s, M3 Lees and Valentines) was committed, it became immobilized in the German minefields and was shot to pieces by assault guns, anti-tank guns and Rudel’s Stukas; the Germans claimed 100 tanks destroyed on the first day of the new Soviet offensive. This number was likely exaggerated since many tanks immobilized by mines were subsequently recovered. On the positive side, Soviet air support for the attack was impressive and a new tactic was used, whereby Il-2 Sturmoviks dropped smoke bombs in front of advancing tank-infantry shock groups in order to reduce the effectiveness of the German defensive fire. Soviet air-ground cooperation was improving.

In order to prevent a breakthrough of the Blue Line, Crisolli’s 13.Panzer-Division dispatched Kampfgruppe Polster (two understrength Panzer-Kompanie from Panzer-Regiment 4 with 12 Pz IV tanks and Müller’s assault guns) and Kampfgruppe Gaza (the I./Panzergrenadier-Regiment 66, which had only a single company of SPWs and some artillery) to counter-attack the Soviet shock groups.⁶⁸ Over a period of several days, the Soviet offensive was blunted and then stopped. The Blue Line would hold for another three and a half months. Rupp did not live to see this, however, since he was killed by a Soviet air raid on his command post on 31 May. By early June, Petrov’s offensive had been halted, although local attacks kept the pressure on AOK 17 in order to prevent the Germans from transferring units from the Kuban to reinforce Heeresgruppe Süd. Indeed, Crisolli’s 13.Panzer-Division would remain in the Kuban until late August 1943 and two assault-gun battalions would remain there until AOK 17 evacuated the Taman Peninsula in September. While the Germans were able to achieve a defensive victory in the Kuban, the forces committed there would have been better employed in von Manstein’s command.

For the Red Army, the Kuban proved a useful arena for learning how to crack open German defensive positions, as well as learning how to improve their combined arms tactics. The Soviet use of armour in the Kuban was limited to brigade-size infantry support attacks, which suffered heavy losses due to the density of German defences, but important lessons were learned in coordinating these attacks with artillery and close air support. The days of Soviet tank units attacking without adequate supporting fires was drawing to a close.

Building up for the Showdown, April–June 1943

By the end of March 1943, both sides were completely exhausted and incapable of further sustained offensive action until their depleted air and tank formations were refitted. The Germans had lost 2,152 tanks during January–March 1943 (many were non-operational tanks abandoned during the retreats or lost at Stalingrad) and only 53 per cent of their remaining 1,500 tanks were operational after von Manstein’s counter-offensive concluded.⁶⁹ The Red Army had also suffered huge tank losses – 5,023 tanks lost in January–March.⁷⁰ However, the three months that followed brought a lull period that both sides used to refit their forces for the next test of strength.