The Augustan Empire 43 BC

Antony was later accused of wrecking the campaign for Cleopatra's sake. He had begun it too late in the season, they said, because he had dallied too long at Alexandria; then he had conducted the invasion itself too hurriedly, eager to return to her side.¹⁴⁸ But the points were hardly fair. The muster in Armenia was perhaps in June or July; what with Canidius' preliminary campaign and the long preliminary marches,¹⁴⁹ it was astounding it could be so soon. Perhaps there was still a case for waiting till 3 5, keeping the army concentrated in the East ready for an early strike in the spring;¹⁵⁰ but there was also the Parthian dynastic crisis to consider, as well as the chance of outflanking the Parthian army by a swift advance now — a ploy in which Antony very nearly succeeded. Of course Parthia would not fall in a single campaign: Iulius Caesar had planned on three years,¹⁵¹ and that was reasonable. But it was also reasonable to hope for a solid victory or so in Media, bolstering the morale of the Roman army and Phraates' internal enemies; then, if necessary, Antony could withdraw and winter in Armenia (though hardly at Cleopatra's side). Antony's strategy made sense.

Erzerum: Kromayer 1896 (c 142) 82. Artaxata: Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 311.

Polemo: Plut. Ant. 38.6; Dio xlix.2ĵ.4. Other kings: Plut. Ant. 37.3.

So Kromayer 1896 (c 142) 100-1; contra, Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 309—10.

1« Brunt 1971 (a 9) 503-4, Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 311 n.37.

So Plut. Ant. 50.3, though at 37.3 he wrote of'6,000' at the initial muster in Armenia. Strab. xi.14.9—12 (530C) speaks of 6,000 cataphracts 'besides the other cavalry', which may explain Plutarch's confusion; or both Plutarch's figures may be right, if the mass of the cavalry joined Antony in eastern Armenia after the muster; or 16,000 perhaps represented the paper strength, 6,000 the force which materialized (Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 311 n.37).

Livy, Per. 130: cf. Plut. Ant. 37.5-58.1 with Pelling 1988 (в 138)adloc. The criticism probably derived from Q. Dellius, an eyewitness of the campaign (Strab. xi. 13.1-4 (5 23Q) and no friend of Cleopatra.

Itwassome 1,000 Roman miles from Zeugma to the Median border (Strab. xi. 13.4—6 (5 24C); Plut. Ant. 38.1), itself a march of three to four months, and Antony's troops first had to march from Antioch.

So Plut .Ant. 38.1, perhaps from Dellius; Sherwin-White 1984^89) 316-17 thinks the point fair. ¹⁵¹ Dio xli11.51.2.

But it went wrong. Things started well, and he drove deep into Media. He indeed reached the capital Phraata[81] before the main Parthian force could double back from Mesopotamia. The Median king Artavasdes had left his royal family in residence at Phraata: he at least was evidently taken by surprise by Antony's strategy and speed. But to get there in time Antony had to rush on ahead of his own siege-engines. That was an evident gamble, though not dissimilar to the risks Caesar himself had famously taken in Gaul and in the Civil War, and the swift arrival of a formidable army might indeed have carried the unprotected city. But it did not, and a siege was necessary. Without the engines, it was a curiously amateurish job.[82] And, crucially, the engines never arrived, for Phraates' cavalry overtook the wagon-train and destroyed it, together with its accompanying two legions.[83] Polemo himself was captured, though not killed - he would be more useful alive when it came to negotiations.[84] Artavasdes of Armenia promptly despaired of Antony's cause, and withdrew with his force: a severe loss, for the heavy Armenian cataphracts would have been particularly useful in defence. A series of engagements followed, with Antony successful in the most substantial of them;[85] but the swift Parthian cavalry fled most effecti­vely, and Antony could not follow it up.

Before long Antony was forced to abandon the siege; and, predict­ably, his retreat turned out to be intensely difficult, with sickness and famine as great a problem as the harrying Parthian archers. The resilience and the valour of Antony and his army became famous, and the comparison with Xenophon's Ten Thousand was an obvious one.[86]Eventually, after an epic final night-time march across the foothills of the Kŭh-e-Sahand range,[87] the army reached the Talkheh, then the Araxes and Armenia. The retreat had taken twenty-seven days, and even now safety could not be taken for granted, given Artavasdes' earlier treach­ery. But Antony successfully made terms with him, and by mid-winter the remains of the army had reached Cappadocia: there were further deaths in this final section of the march. The total losses in the campaign were indeed catastrophic, some third of the entire army.[88]