The Augustan Empire 43 BC

So ended Antony's great attempt to emulate Alexander. Ironically, his best military qualities had seldom been clearer - his energy, his enterprise, his inspirational leadership; and yet it was disastrous. Plutarch later did well to make this campaign the centrepiece of his Life, but not only for those reasons. This was indeed the turning-point of the triumviral period. Till now Antony's military prestige and power had far outstripped Octavian, and he had consequently been the stronger partner in their diplomatic exchanges. This campaign should have raised his supremacy beyond challenge.

But instead the victories were being won elsewhere, and by Octavian. His war with the popular favourite Sextus was a delicate one to fight: it could much too easily seem Octavian's personal vendetta. Indeed, even while he was fighting it disturbances at Rome required urgent atten­tion;[89] there were grumblings in the veteran colonies too;[90] Etruria was particularly restive.[91] Octavian could not afford to lose or delay - for all he knew, Antony was carrying all before him in Parthia - but the events of 38 had shown how formidable an enemy Sextus could be.[92] Now Agrippa's preparations were magnificent, but Sextus had been preparing too, and by 36 he had some 350 ships.[93] Just as he had in 38, Octavian even sent to Lepidus in Africa for help. In 38 Lepidus had made no response, content to leave Octavian with his own problems.[94] This time he decided to come in force. He eventually arrived with twelve legions and 5,000 cavalry, with a further four legions following as reinforce­ments (two were destroyed by Sextus' fleet before they could land).¹⁶⁶ Perhaps Lepidus already had clear plans of his own, perhaps not; he at least knew that the great battle for the West should not be fought without him.

By July 36 Octavian was able to launch a triple-pronged attack on Sextus in Sicily. He would attack from the north and Statilius Taurus from the east; Lepidus would attack the western coast. The plan was good. The campaign itself was to show how difficult Sextus would find it to stretch his forces to meet several threats. But Octavian's forces were beset by storms; so many ships were lost that there were thoughts of delaying the campaign to 35. At first only Lepidus managed to land in strength, and he laid Sextus' lieutenant L. Plinius Rufus under siege in

Lilybaeum. In the east there were naval battles, with first Agrippa successful off Mylae, then Sextus defeating Octavian himself off Tauro- menium. Sextus' victory was more emphatic than Agrippa's, but at least Octavian established bridgeheads both by Cape Tyndaris and near Tauromenium: Sextus' resistance on land was surprisingly half-hearted, particularly at Tauromenium.¹⁶⁷ Octavian soon had twenty-one legions on the island,¹⁶⁸ besides Lepidus' army; Sextus had only ten.¹⁶⁹ He was soon hemmed into the island's north-east corner, a triangle bounded by Mylae and Tauromenium, and Mylae itself fell soon afterwards. And now even Lepidus himself was approaching, rather tardily. His part in the whole campaign is indeed enigmatically lackadaisical: it is odd that he did not move eastwards earlier - that was clearly where he was needed, and perhaps expected.¹⁷⁰ The sequel was to show him dissatisfied with his subordinate role. Was he perhaps content to let Octavian and Sextus weaken one another in the east, hoping by a last minute arrival to claim the authority he felt he deserved? The events of 44/3 had shown his capacity to bide his time before a decisive change of front.¹⁷¹ If Octavian distrusted him, it was not without reason.¹⁷²

Sextus' last hope was to pit everything on a battle at sea. Perhaps unwisely, Octavian accepted battle (there was possibly even a formal challenge and acceptance, agreeing time, place and numbers):¹⁷³ but the risk came off. The battle was fought off Naulochus (3 September 36), with 300 ships on either side. Agrippa, not Octavian, took command. By now brawn rather than skill was dominant in naval warfare, and Agrippa's heavier ships and more sophisticated grappling equipment carried the day. Only seventeen of Sextus' ships escaped. Sextus himself fled: his only slender hope lay with Antony in the East.

His land forces came over to Octavian with little demur. Plinius Rufus had moved eastwards to Messana, presumably following Lepidus. By now he had command of a large portion of Sextus' army, comprising eight legions.¹⁷⁴ It was clear that they would surrender: but to whom? Agrippa and Lepidus appeared before the city: Agrippa insisted that they wait for Octavian, but Lepidus overrode him. His forces indeed linked with those of Plinius, and together they sacked Messina. Lepidus now seemed in control of the combined force, some twenty-two legions. He had not been so powerful for years. Now if ever was the time to assert

¹⁴⁷ App. BCiv. v.i 10.457-9, Gabba 1970 (в 5 5) adloc.