The Augustan Empire 43 BC

¹⁶⁸ App. BCiv. v.i 16.481; Brunt 1971 (a 9) 498. ¹⁶⁹ Brunt 1971 (a 9) 499-500.

¹⁷⁰ App. BCiv. v.io}.427 with Gabba 1970 (в 55) ad loc. ¹⁷¹ Cf. САН ix² 471, 482.4.

Dio xlix. 8.3-4 even suggests that Lepidus was in secret league with Sextus, and that Octavian suspected as much (cf. xlix. 1.4). That is implausible, and probably influenced both by Octavian's propaganda and by Dio's tendency to guess at motivation; but some distrust is possible enough.

App. BCiv. v.i 16.489 with Gabba 1970 (в j 5) ad loc.; cf. Gabba 1977 (C94).

App. BCiv. v. 122.505 with Gabba 1970(8 55) ad loc.

himself, to show how unfairly he had been excluded from all those diplomatic dealings at Brundisium, Misenum and Tarentum. He laid claim to all Sicily, though he magnanimously offered to exchange Sicily and Africa for all his former portion, Narbonensis and Nearer and Further Spain.¹⁷⁵ At first Octavian's friends remonstrated gently, then Octavian himself more fiercely; Lepidus was adamant. The legions were unamused. But the delusion could not last. Octavian entered his camp, almost unaccompanied — though there was a sizeable force of cavalry just outside. The troops at least knew where the balance of power lay: with only a little scuffling, they joined Octavian. Lepidus was allowed to keep his property and his life, and he even remained pontifex maximus. But Octavian stripped him of membership of the triumvirate and his provincial command.¹⁷⁶ There were no thoughts of consulting Antony first. Octavian took over Africa and Sicily into his own domain. Lepidus retired into exile and anonymity.

That effectively concluded the elimination of Sextus and Lepidus. Antony and Octavian remained; and Antony was beginning to look a little tattered.

IX. 35-33 B.C.

Politics now looked simpler: the reckoning would surely come, and we might expect Antony and Octavian to spend the next few years in preparation. But it was not quite like that. Octavian, it is true, seems to have seen the future clearly enough. He soon intensified his battle to win Italian public opinion, with fierce propaganda against Cleopatra and Antony; he may even have been in contact with Antony's enemy Artavasdes of Armenia (unless that charge is simply a fiction of Antony's propaganda);¹⁷⁷ and he was soon battle-hardening his troops in Illyri- cum, suggestively close to the dividing-line with Antony's dominion. But Antony was slow to respond. He may have talked of joining Octavian in an Illyrian campaign¹⁷⁸ — in self-defence, that would have been no bad ploy, if it were practicable: but really his focus lay on the East - indeed, on the Jar East, and for several years he was preoccupied with vengeance on the perfidious Armenian king Artavasdes. Of course an Armenian success would do something to mend the shame of the Parthian debacle, but in Roman eyes Armenia lacked the glamour of Parthia; a new Alexander should be more glorious than that, and Armenia could only be the beginning; but a clearer-sighted man would have realized that now Parthia itself was a lost cause. With Octavian preparing in the West, there simply would not be time for the years a

"5 Cf. САН ix2 ₄g₆. 176 MRR II 400.

¹⁷⁷ Dio xux.14.6. ¹⁷⁸ App. BCiv. v.132.549.

second Parthian invasion would demand. Yet in 3 } nearly all Antony's legions were still in the extreme east of his domain; only then, very slowly, did they begin the long march west. War with Octavian was scarcely foremost in Antony's mind. Perhaps he was peaceable, content by now to share the world; perhaps he was simply naive. But it is clear which of the two was seeking the breach, and which had his thoughts elsewhere.