And Antony? His thoughts were still far away. In 33 he planned a second Parthian campaign, this time with his new ally Artavasdes of Media: they were now more closely linked, with Alexander Helios betrothed to the king's daughter Iotape. Iotape had indeed been safely transported to Alexandria - an additional stimulus to loyalty, perhaps. In the spring of 33 Antony and Artavasdes met on the Araxes. All, or almost all, of Antony's eastern army was already in Armenia, a full sixteen legions.250 In 36, the need to concentrate his troops had delayed the invasion till uncomfortably late in the year; now, he was in a much better position for an early attack. But such thoughts were already out of date, and finally even Antony came to realize it. The defence of the eastern frontier was left to the Median king and to Polemo, to whom he now gave Lesser Armenia.251 Antony's own troops began the 2,500-km march back to the Ionian coast. At last, he had 'turned to the civil war'.252
x. preparation: 32 b.c.
Almost certainly, the second term of the triumvirate expired on 31 December 33.253 This time there would evidently be no question of renewing it, even as the duovirate it had now become. This would not leave the legal position of Antony and Octavian unsupportable,254 but it was certainly embarrassing, and more embarrassing for Octavian than for Antony. Octavian had lately been making so much of his respect for Roman tradition and the Roman republican constitution; and Octavian would be in Italy, where legal questions could awaken more interest. In the East Antony simply ruled - as god, monarch, proconsul, or triumvir, it hardly mattered. In Italy , it might. And Octavian's position was delicate in other ways, for if the triumvirate had expired the consuls might matter more; and the consuls of 3 2 were to be C. Sosius and Cn.
preparation: 32 b.c.
Domitius Ahenobarbus — not merely Antonians but peculiarly impressive ones, particularly Domitius with his record of republican political commitment and all the weight of an ancient family. Nor was he the only old republican to prefer Antony to Octavian. So did Cato's grandson, L. Calpurnius Bibulus, and there were others too.255 Not that the issue would be decided simply by the credentials of one's Roman followers. It would depend on martial strength: and Antony's army and Antony himself were infinitely more formidable a force than anything Octavian had yet confronted. In retrospect, we too readily think of Octavian as already marked out for victory. History may have been on his side, but many of the crucial factors were not. Since 37 Octavian had certainly done much to redress the odds, which till then had heavily favoured Antony: Octavian's politics had been much the shrewder, his campaigns the more triumphant; his supporters increasingly included persons of family and achievement.256 But to a measured observer those odds were still on Antony.
The pleasantries soon started. The consuls were armed with a dispatch from Antony, recounting his
For the moment, Octavian himself was sensibly absent from the city. But a few weeks later he responded with a show of force in the Senate: he was surrounded by an armed guard, and, whatever his legal status, he took his seat on a chair of state between the consuls. Rome was accustomed to violent displays, but this was not the sort of tradition that Octavian wished to be seen reviving; still, it was immediately effective, for the consuls fled to Antony. Many senators, possibly several
255 Syme 1959 (a 93) 222, 239, 266—70, 282; Syme 1986 (a 95) 206-7, 264.
г» Syme 1939 (a 93) 234-42.
All the triumviral acts had already been ratified in advance: cf. above, p. 20 with n.80.
Cf. p. 41 and n. 210.
49
Cf. Gray 1975 (c 102) 17; Reinhold 1988 (в i jo) on Dio L.2.3. For the alternative view, that Sosius launched an attack on 1 January, cf. Fadinger 1969 (в 42) 19; n.i.