The Augustan Empire 43 BC

The oath did nothing to improve Octavian's legal status, but its moral implications were extraordinary. It was taken to him personally. There were a few civilian precedents,²⁸⁴ but the nearest analogies were in fact military, the oath taken by soldiers to their general: and it was appropriate that Italy and the provinces were 'demanding Octavian as their general' for the war. Besides the backing it gave Octavian, this was also one way of preparing Italy psychologically for conflict. There were doubtless others too - for instance, the Res Gestae passage goes on to speak of more than 700 senators 'serving under Octavian's colours',²⁸⁵ and such language probably goes back to the events themselves. Of course, there had been appeals to consensus Italiae, the united sentiment of all Italy, many times before.²⁸⁶ Now, as usual, the public's feelings were doubtless more complex. For one thing, Italy was growling at Octa­vian's new financial exactions, severe even by the standards of the last twenty years.²⁸⁷ And it would be naive to think that the oath was wholly voluntary. Some communities were indeed 'excused' from taking it, for instance Antony's own veteran colonies.²⁸⁸ Still, the claim of harmony was not mere hypocrisy. A great many senators, for instance, seem to have come over to Octavian during these final stages;²⁸⁹ and it seems likely that only a few of Antony's colonists exploited Octavian's dispensation.²⁹⁰ In 40 the veterans had refused to fight one another, but this time it would be different. At last, Italy was almost solid for Octavian.

Cf. esp. von Premerstein 1957 (a 74) and, briefly, Brunt and Moore 1967 (в 2t;)on RG 25.2; Syme 1939 (a 93) 284-92; Herrmann 1968 (c 117) 78-89; Linderski 1984 (c 164); Girardet 1990 (c 97) 345—50. The evidence for the oath's dating is set out by von Premerstein 1937 (a 74) 41; Syme 1939 (a 93) 284-5 suggests, probably rightly, that the Italian cities took the oath not simultaneously but in sequence.

Von Premerstein 1937 (a 74) 27-36; for important qualifications, Herrmann 1968 (c 117) 50-89.

RG 25.3, cf. n.260 above. The phrase is often taken to imply that all the senators accompanied Octavian on his campaign: that need not follow. ²⁸⁶ Syme 1939 (a 93) 285-6.

^2,7 Plut. Ant. 58.2; Dio l. 10.4-5, '6-3, 20.3, liii.2.3; Pliny, HNxxxvti.io; cf. Syme 1939 (a 93) 284; Nicolet 1976 (d 104) 95; Yavetz 1969 (a i 10) 25-6.

Especially Bononia, Suet. Aug. 17.2; but it seems that even here Octavian made attempts to win them over (Dio l.6.3).

Cf. Wallmann 1976 (c 242). »0 Dio l.6.3, cf- li.4.6 with Keppie 1983 (e 65) 76.

The time for action was approaching, though the summer was wearing on, and it did not now look as if the decision would be reached this year. That was in Octavian's interests, in fact: Antony had his vast army ready, backed by all the wealth of the East; Octavian's treasury was worryingly empty.²⁹¹ But Octavian's political preparations, at least, were almost complete, and in late summer he could declare war. That too should be done in the right style. War was declared on Cleopatra alone: she after all was the real enemy. And it was declared in the most Roman of fashions: Octavian disinterred, perhaps even fabricated, an ancient fetial rite — a picturesque affair of casting a spear into a symbolically hostile patch of land.²⁹² Not of. course that Antony was ignored: he was stripped of the consulship he was to hold the next year, and also of 'the rest of his power'²⁹³ — presumably the triumvirate which he was still claiming and, on one possible view, he still held. But he was not yet declared a public enemy. The moment for that would soon come.²⁹⁴ For Antony would surely stand by Cleopatra: and then, would he not be a self-confessed enemy of Rome?

XI. ACTiим, 31 B.C.

During winter 32/1 Antony's force stood ready in Greece. His main fleet was in the harbour of Actium; but Greece's western coast is pitted by natural harbours, and it was best to defend them all. Pockets of ships were distributed fairly widely - in Methone, for instance, Leucas, Corcyra, Taenarum and probably Corinth.²⁹⁵ Antony himself wintered in Patrae, with yet another contingent of ships and men. The next summer would clearly see the critical campaign, and he could still be sanguine. True, Italy was lost, and lost more conclusively than he would have hoped; that was disappointing. But he could reasonably reflect that, once Octavian had survived the buffeting of the Perusine War, he would always have the advantage there. In Italy Octavian was the man in possession: far less adept politicians would have been able to capitalize on that. Anyway, the politics were virtually over. Antony might still go through the motions of offering to resign the triumvirate, after he had won his victory (as he now had to specify): two months later, or possibly six.²⁹⁶ It all hardly mattered now.

Cf. p. 5 3 and n. 287.