The Augustan Empire 43 BC

Antony's chances of victory were evidently very poor. The most he could realistically hope for was to break out with as many ships and men as possible, and this seems to have been in his mind from the beginning: he shipped his treasure-chest, for instance, an extraordinary thing to do unless he was planning flight; he also gave orders to carry sails, which was most unusual for an ancient battle. He could keep his mind a little open, perhaps: he knew he could not break out without a fight, sea- battles were often unpredictable, and if things went surprisingly well then of course he would try to fight it out to the end. The weather might even be rough - it had been for the last few days before the battle - and that might add some further unpredictability: his galleons might better survive a buffeting than Octavian's slightly lighter ships. Still, the chance of a break-out in force was always the more likely option. He may not have told too many of his own troops: it would of course be highly damaging to morale, for most of them would have to be left to the victor's mercy. One need not doubt their surprise and dismay when, in mid-battle, they realized the truth.³¹⁰ But his own mind must have been clear enough. He must also have known that the break-out was not going to be easy. Outflanking Octavian's superior numbers would be impossible, and the only way was to drive a wedge through the centre. Even if that could be done, a flight southwards involved a technical difficulty. The island of Leucas juts out just south of Actium, and with prevailing winds from the west and north west it would be hard to clear it under sail.³¹¹ The best hope was to join the battle as far out to sea as he could (Octavian would in fact be unlikely to resist this, for he too would want open waters to exploit his superior numbers and manoeuvrability); and if possible to delay it till the afternoon, when the wind typically veers from west to west-north-west.

That indeed is exactly what happened. On the morning of 2 Sep­tember 31, Antony's fleet took up its station outside the harbour mouth. Cleopatra's squadron of sixty ships rested behind his centre, ready (it seems) for a concentrated strike on any weak point in Octavian's line - a sort of maritime Panzer-tactic, in fact. Octavian's much longer line moved to hem them in. Then, most eerily, for hours nothing happened. Antony was waiting for afternoon; Octavian would be content to wait much longer, for it was Antony, not he, who needed to break the blockade by battle. Around midday there was at last some movement of both fleets to seaward; but still, no real action. The first decisive move came in early afternoon, for both northern wings — Antony's right and Octavian's left under Agrippa — began to drift further north. It is not clear who started it. Perhaps it was Agrippa, as our principal source Plutarch suggests: now that both fleets were in more open sea, he could reasonably begin an outflanking move. More likely it was Antony, trying to entice Octavian into leaving a critical gap in the centre of his line. Anyway, gaps began to open, at least in Antony's line and perhaps

^3,0 Memorably described by Plut. Ant. 66.6-8. зп Carter 1970 (c 51) 215-27.

ALEXANDRIA, 30 B.C.

in Octavian's too. Cleopatra's squadron seized the moment: she hoisted sail and bore down on the enemy. It is hard to say which side was the more startled. The squadron forced its way through, perhaps surpris­ingly easily;³¹² Antony himself moved from his massive flagship to a quinquereme and followed. So did others, but perhaps not very many. It is hard to think that even a hundred ships escaped; these had some legionaries on board, perhaps one hundred apiece — but the bulk of the fleet, and over three-quarters of the army, remained.

Once Antony and Cleopatra had sailed away, the rest of their fleet saw little point in the battle. Some galleons made their way back to the harbour in a peculiarly undignified way, backing water in a halting crab­like movement to port.³¹³ There was perhaps a little fighting, but nothing very fierce. The whole battle produced only 5,000 casualties, an amazingly small number by the standards of a sea-battle. Octavian did his best to make it a little more spectacular: a few ships were fired;³¹⁴ and he took the ostentatious precaution of spending the night on board ship.

But it was hard to disguise the truth. The Battle of Actium was a very lame affair. Such as it was, Antony and Cleopatra arguably won it: at least, they achieved all they could reasonably have hoped. But they had so decisively lost the campaign that the success made little difference. There was some talk of the surviving army saving itself on land, and some forlornly set out for Macedonia;³¹⁵ but it was all highly unrealistic. They soon went over to Octavian, who gave generous terms.³¹⁶ The Battle of Actium delayed the end for a year; nothing more.

XII. ALEXANDRIA, 30 B.C.