The Augustan Empire 43 BC

DioL.4.4-5 with Reinhold 1988 (в i jo);cf. Livy, 1.3 2.4 with Ogilvie 196) (в ad be.; Rich 1976 (a 81) 56-7, ioj-6; Wiedemann 1986 (f 237).

rf/v aAAr/v tЈovoiav vaaav, Dio L.4.3 with Reinhold 1988(8 150) ad be.; cf. Plut. Ant. 60.1.

Antony certainly was declared a bottis at some point (App. BCiv. iv.4 j. 193, cf. iv.38.161; Suet. Aug. 17.2): probably later in 32 or in early 31 rather than after Actium, as Fadinger 1969(842) 243­5 2 argues.

Cf. Dio l.11-13; Oros. vi. 19.6-7; Strab. viii.4.1-4 (359Q; Veil. Pat. 11.84.1, Plut. Ant. 67.5; Kromayer 1898 (c 143) 60. ²⁵⁶ Dio L.7.1-2.

In military terms Antony still looked ahead. He had been unable to recruit in Italy, but not all orientals were weaklings, and his forces were probably the larger, possibly 100,000 infantry against Octavian's 80,000. The cavalry was equally matched, but Antony's fleet of 500 men-of-war was more numerous than Octavian's and - almost as important — his were the larger ships.[149] The way naval battles were now fought, bulk was likely to count; certainly, it had counted at Naulochus. Antony's side was also the wealthier. Octavian's exactions had doubtless done some­thing to replenish his treasury, but he could still hardly compete: for one thing, he had already had to give his troops a precautionary donative.[150]Last of all, there was Antony himself, still surely more effective a general than Octavian despite those Illyrian victories. Antony knew how little those meant. True, he must have heard impressive things of Agrippa, who was still virtually untried when last Antony was in the West; he might prove a worthier adversary. But, everything considered, Antony still looked to be the winner.

It was clear what his strategy should be. Invading Italy was not an option, for sound military reasons.[151] Antony would have to wait for Octavian to come to him, just as Pompey had waited in 49—48; and, again like Pompey, he would hope to harass Octavian's fleet during the crossing, when the ships would be terribly cumbersome, with cavalry, legionaries and baggage on board. Even if they could land, they might find it hard to support themselves if Antony could maintain his expected superiority at sea. The lesson of 48 was again there to be learnt, when Caesar had certainly found it very difficult to establish himself with sufficient numbers of troops.[152] It might still be disconcerting that Pompey had finally lost, and then in the next civil war the eastern side had lost again; but Antony could still reflect that Pompey should really have won at Dyrrhachium, while Brutus and Cassius had fought their battle too far east.[153] The eastern side should strategically be the stronger. Sulla was the more telling precedent.

Once again, it all went wrong.[154] The danger in Antony's position was simply the necessity to divide his army and fleet among so many harbours. These various forces could reasonably be expected to rein­force one another if threatened; besides, the main force at Actium could be expected to harry any invasion fleet as it sailed down the Adriatic, if any target further south were chosen for its landing. But Agrippa was too quick. Surprisingly early in the } i season, he struck with an advance force and took Methone, then launched surprise attacks elsewhere on the coast, even as far north as Corcyra. Meanwhile Octavian himself managed to cross, surprisingly unimpeded, to the mainland north of Corcyra; within a few days he had reached Actium, and occupied the tactical strongpoint in the area, the hill of Mikalitzi. Soon Octavian had linked his camp by earthworks to the harbour of Gomaros. We do not even hear of any resistance, which is astounding. Perhaps there were operations which our sources omit, perhaps the Actium land-force had been called away to meet one of Agrippa's sudden threats elsewhere. Anyway, the first tricks had fallen to Octavian, and they turned out to be decisive.