The Russian Century: A Hundred Years of Russian Lives

The same two KGB agents tailed us at the airport and there was another one from the institute. Evidently, this was to confirm that my student identification was invalid. When we submitted our tickets for verification, they demanded my student identification. Determining that I did not have it, they demanded that I surrender my plane ticket. Without a passport, a new ticket could not be purchased (my passport had already been turned in by my father in exchange for the visa). We were already prepared to go by train when luck helped us. In the confusion at the ticket counter, we were able to buy a ticket for another flight. We did not present our passports. Instead, we left the change for the ticket seller. When we were walking to the plane, we were noticed, for upon our arrival in Moscow, we discovered that our suitcases were forced open, the locks wrenched out, and the belongings searched.

Two weeks later we were already in Vienna, and Siberia was only a nightmare in our memory. Thank God!

Rome 8/VI/74

Chapter Thirty-Three

Leonid Shebarshin, Three Days in August

Leonid Shebarshin had a long and successful career in the KGB. He was the station chief at the Soviet Embassy in Teheran during the collapse of the Shah’s regime and endured a siege by Iranian militants. He later served as head of the First Directorate, the chief of intelligence. During the three-day coup attempt against the government of Mikhail Gorbachev (August 19–21, 1991) he was the de facto head at KGB headquarters. The selection which follows describes the days of the attempted coup. Taken from Leonid She-barshin, “Avgust” [August] in Druzhba narodov, Moscow, Nos. 5–6, 1992.

In the organizational structure of the KGB [Committee for State Security] the head of the intelligence branch is one of the vice-chairmen and thus a member of the highest leadership circle of the Committee.

The First Directorate is somewhat physically as well as organizationally and psychologically removed from the Committee [KGB headquarters]. Nevertheless, intelligence gathering is an integral part of State Security and whatever took place at the highest levels of the Committee concerned us. The rank and file heard echoes of internal conflicts and was the object of the chairman’s orders and of the Collegium of the KGB. As a rule all this was of little concern to us. The highest levels limited themselves to general instructions on the surveillance of foreign agents, on anti-Soviet organizations abroad, and on centers of ideological subversion. The First Chief Directorate [the intelligence service] was procedurally occupied with problems and directives from above and kept sharp surveillance over any particular situation.

It was not customary to hold meetings with all the vice-chairmen present. Kriuchkov [the KGB chairman] would meet with each separately. Meetings of the committee leadership were frequently called. These would include the

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heads of the major independent subdivisions. The Collegium of the Committee convened regularly and invited representatives of all the principal directorates and, on occasion, the KGB heads of the various Soviet republics, regions and districts.

Once or twice a week I would go from the First Chief Directorate to KGB headquarters on Lubianka Square in order to meet with my colleagues in an informal atmosphere and find out the latest news. At precisely 1330 hours [1:30 PM] the chairman and his vice-chairs would gather in the dining room on the fourth floor near the chairman’s office and seat themselves at a huge table. The meals were ordinary; the portions modest, with no lavish dishes. The service was quick and attentive.

During the meals conversation would flow freely. Hardly a day would go by without complaints at the mass media. Its attacks on the KGB were unrelenting. The magazine Ogonek was a particular irritant but other publications were also criticized for their lack of objectivity. The mood of the conversation was generally pessimistic, although Kriuchkov was by nature an optimist. One of his favorite sayings was: “We can lose anytime, what we ought to do is win.” It was significant, however, that upon listening to some joyless piece of news he would limit his response to a prolonged “ye-s-s” without expressing his opinion or giving orders.