The Russian Century: A Hundred Years of Russian Lives

In the first half of June of 1991, the penultimate plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held. I had previously categorically declined Kriuchkov’s suggestion that I become a candidate at the 28th Party congress for Central Committee membership. However, I was still invited to the plenary sessions. At the June plenary the General Secretary of the Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, was subjected to very severe criticism. He defended himself and went on the attack in what was, in my opinion, a very improper style. The plenary came to nothing; the status quo was maintained. The whole event had an inexpressibly burdensome effect on me. It was not just that the nation’s and the party’s grave situation had been revealed. This was not a secret anymore. One was struck by the atmosphere of hopelessness, the absence of any concept of the future, and the falsifying of thought by phrase-mongering.

According to tradition the chief of intelligence informed the secretaries of the party organs within the First Directorate of what transpired at the plenary. I did so in a neutral tone without leaving out the particulars of each speech and ended with a summary of my gloomy conclusions. I insisted that we must do everything to preserve the intelligence team, to carry out our duties honorably, and to maintain discipline. I remarked that the First Chief Directorate [FCD] should not distance itself from the KGB for our ranks should be very tightly drawn during these perilous times. My remarks were received calmly. But the questions came afterwards: “What will become of the Party? Of the nation? What should we do and what do the leaders intend to do?” I had to break with all tradition which presupposed the omniscience of the leadership and simply say: “ I don’t know.”

I reported to Kriuchkov about my meeting with the various secretaries. But he offered no comments. Naturally the same day the KGB party secretary (“the big secretary”) found out about my report, but no comments came from him as well. This was a very alarming sign. Our leadership also did not know what to do.

Events cannot be dispassionately assessed at the moment they occur. Observers, and, even more so, participants are overwhelmed by emotion. They can rarely distinguish the actual from the apparent. They are confused by the rush of contradictory information and by their hyper-excited state. In time the picture of what transpired takes on more definite contours but telling details recede from memory and the general comprehension of all that took place is molded by personal bias, fear and hope.

Exactly two weeks have gone by since the morning of 19 August 1991. Perhaps this is the most appropriate time to try and recreate the tapestry of events at the point they overcame me.

Leonid Shebarshin, Three Days in August

319

18 AUGUST

A cool clear morning and the day promises to be a good one. At 0800 (0 eight hundred) as is usual on Sundays, I am headed on foot from the government dacha, to the “object” [the grounds of the FCD]. An hour-and-a-half of tennis with my aide Iurii Ivanovich Novikov, then a five minute sauna, a quick shower and to work. As usual, I’d look through the telegrams, the news agency communications and sign off on the materials. On the 18th of August no significant information had come in and there was nothing to report. An hour later I was back on the path to the dacha through the familiar grove of trees.

Around 1500 [3:00 PM] the telephone gave an ululating call—it was the Kremlin. Such a call on a Sunday promised nothing good—either some emergency or some rush assignment from Kriuchkov who was at his desk round the clock. I cursed out loud (there was no one in the room) and picked up the receiver. Grushko was on the line.

“Kriuchkov has ordered you to get two combat-ready groups of commandos together by 2100, fifty men each with transport.”

“By 2100, but it’s after three now on a Sunday. What’s the assignment?”

“Don’t know, he called on the mobile phone, told me to transmit the order: two groups with transport.”

“Who’s to be in charge of the groups after that? Who do I call?”

“Zhardetskii [head of military counter-intelligence] will be there. He’ll be in charge. That’s all I know.”