The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

94. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17. It is just possible, though not probable, that an even stronger candidate for either of these titles is identified in files not seen by Mitrokhin. Like most, if not all, British agents recruited in the 1930s who were still active after the Second World War, Norwood had more than one codename in the course of her career. Though Mitrokhin’s notes refer to her only as HOLA, her codename in 1945, shortly after she returned from GRU to NKGB control, was RITA. Extracts from KGB files made available by the SVR to Weinstein and Vassiliev, though not mentioning Norwood by name, identify RITA as an employee of the Non-Ferrous Metals [Research] Association (Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 194; cf. the reference to RITA in VENONA decrypts, 5th release, part 2, p. 247.)

95. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.

96. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.

97. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 59-61. Cf. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1.

98. vol. 6, ch. 6. In March 1943 Kurchatov sent similar reports to M. G. Pervukhin, Deputy Prime Minister and commissar of the chemical industry. The text, first published in Voprossi Istorii Estestvoznania i Tekhniki (1992), no. 3, is reprinted in translation in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, appendix 2, pp. 446-53.

99. vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin’s notes do not reveal the identity of MAR.

100. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 1-4.

101. vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin’s note does not identify the recipient of Kurchatov’s top secret report. Given its importance, however, it was probably addressed, like his report of March 7 (also quoted in vol. 6, ch. 6), to Beria. Cf. Kurchatov’s report to Pervukhin of July 3, 1943 in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, appendix 2, pp. 454-6.

102. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 104.

103. vol. 6, ch. 6.

104. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, p. 5. Cf. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 103.

105. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 103.

106. There is some indication that later in 1944 FOGEL/PERS was providing intelligence from the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, laboratory of the MANHATTAN project. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 10, 29. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, pp. 190-1; Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 319.

107. Suggestions to the contrary derive chiefly from two sources: a fabricated version of the career of PERS (renamed PERSEUS), apparently devised by the SVR for purposes of mystification, perhaps to protect Theodore Hall (cf. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 271; Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, pp. 190-1n.); and the fallible memory of Pavel Sudoplatov, far less reliable on atomic espionage than on the “special actions” to which he devoted most of his career (cf. Holloway, “Sources for Stalin and the Bomb”). The New York residency was dismayed to learn early in 1945 that FOGEL/PERS had declined an offer of employment as a construction engineer at Los Alamos, probably owing to a mixture of family pressures and fear of exposure. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 192.

108. vol. 6, ch. 6.

109. vol. 8, ch. 12, para. 1.

110. vol. 6, ch. 6.

111. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

112. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 4

113. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 313-14. Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, p. 396. Early in the war, Philby had tried and failed to enter Bletchley Park.

114. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 3.

115. Haslam, “Stalin’s Fears of a Separate Peace 1942,” pp. 97-9.

116. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 273-4, 305; Schmidt, “Der Hess-Flug und das Kabinet Churchill”; Schmidt, “The Marketing of Rudolf Hess.”

117. Record of dinner conversation at the Kremlin, October 18, 1944, FO 800/414, PRO.

118. Some of the Hess conspiracy theories were examined in the BBC2 documentary, Hess: An Edge of Conspiracy (presenter: Christopher Andrew; producer: Roy Davies), first broadcast January 17, 1990.

119. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 216-18.

120. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 334-7.

121. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 216.

122. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 217n.

123. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 154. At a meeting with Christopher Andrew in August 1990, Cairncross admitted that he did supply intelligence from Bletchley Park to the NKGB before the battle of Kursk but declined to give details.

124. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 314; Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, p. 396. 125. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 218.

126. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 1.

Chapter Eight Victory