1. As late as 1990 Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the Central Committee, which was largely responsible for determining foreign intelligence requirements, claimed that intelligence reports in 1943 showed that some in Washington as well as in London were considering “the possibility of terminating the coalition with the Soviet Union and reaching an accord with Nazi Germany, or with the Nazi Generals, on the question of waging a joint war against the Soviet Union”:
Therefore when we talk about Stalin’s distrust with regard to Churchill, at a certain stage towards those surrounding Roosevelt, not so much towards Roosevelt himself, we should pay attention to the fact that he based this mistrust on a very precise knowledge of specific facts.
The “facts” produced by the Center were, in all probability, mere conspiracy theories of the kind which, in greater or lesser degree, distorted Soviet intelligence assessment throughout, and even beyond, the Stalinist era. (Interview by Christopher Andrew with Valentin Falin in Moscow for BBC2, December 12, 1990.)
2. On CPUSA operations against Trotskyists and heretics, see Klehr, Haynes and Firsov,
3. vol. 6, ch. 12. On the FBI bugging of Nelson, see also Klehr, Haynes and Firsov,
4. vol. 6, ch. 12. On Hopkins, see above, chapter 7.
5. See above, chapter 7.
6. Benson and Warner (eds.),
7. Zarubin to Center, June 3, 1943: VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, pp. 157-8. Zarubin moved to Washington during June.
8. Following the corrupt governorships of Huey and Earl Long, Sam Jones established a reputation for scrupulous honesty. On his term as governor, see Dawson,
9. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. The US “military intelligence officer” may have had knowledge of the information on Zarubin’s involvement in the massacre of Polish officers contained in Mironov’s letter to Hoover.
10. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
11. Sudoplatovs,
12. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
13. Samolis (ed.)
14. vol. 5, sec. 11. Sudoplatov wrongly claims that Mironov was simply “hospitalized and discharged from the service” on the grounds of schizophrenia;
15. VENONA decrypts, 4th release, part 4, pp. 115-16.
16. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 6, app. 2, part 7. Zarubin’s immediate successor as resident in New York in the summer of 1943, probably on a temporary basis, had been Pavel Klarin (codenamed LUKA); VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, pp. 180ff. On Abbiate’s previous career see above, chapter 4.
17. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 2, pp. 205-6.
18. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, p. 175. The telegram from the Center appointing Abbiate as resident refers to him by his codename SERGEI, identified in the NSA decrypt as Pravdin (Abbiate’s alias in the USA). Apresyan’s transfer to San Francisco was not necessarily a demotion in view of the forthcoming organizing conference of the United Nations, attended by NKGB agent Harry Dexter White and presided over by the GRU agent Alger Hiss.
19. vol. 7, ch. 2, 1; app. 3,