The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

13. Mitrokhin’s notes do not provide complete statistics for the purge of security and intelligence personnel. In 1970, however, 1,092 officials were dismissed from the central apparatus of the interior ministry and 3,202 individuals deprived of Party membership (k-19,551). During 1970 more than a hundred StB agents defected to the West (k-19,559).

14. k-19,566.

15. The KGB liaison office report cited as an example of the full and frank intelligence provided by Kaska the fact that he “told us all that he knew about Indra’s behavior in connection with his visit to the GDR…” Mitrokhin’s notes give no further information on this episode (k-19,645).

16. k-19,555.

17. k-19,576.

18. Sinitsyn reported that both Kaska and Husák had wanted to make further enquiries about KGB records on individuals “whose behavior in 1968-9 gave rise to doubts”; k-19,587.

19. Indra was seen by Husák as a potential rival, and his move in 1971 from his position as Party secretary to the prestigious but not very influential post of chairman of the National Assembly was probably intended to curtail his influence within the CPCz. Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945, pp. 111-12.

20. k-19,554.

21. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 157-8.

22. k-19,554. On the problems of calculating the final total of the purge of the CPCz, see Kusin, From Dubček to Charter 77, pp. 85-9.

23. k-19,554.

24. k-19,541. The probable date of the meeting was April 1972.

25. k-16,329. k-19,158. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give FYODOROV’s real identity.

26. k-19,609.

27. k-19,600.

28. k-19,601.

29. Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, pp. 100-1.

30. k-19,603.

31. k-19,606.

32. k-19,62.

33. k-19,68.

34. k-19,62,92,643.

35. Kusin, From Dubček to Charter 77, p. 194.

36. Dubček describes his surveillance and harassment by the StB in Hope Dies Last, ch. 29.

37. t-7,272,297. Dubček makes no mention of this episode in his memoirs.

38. k-19,330.

39. k-19,75.

40. k-19,77.

41. k-19,76.

42. The KGB team sent to Czechoslovakia “to help with the investigation of the Grohman case at a higher professional level” consisted of A. A. Fabrichnikov and V. A. Pakhomov of the Second Chief Directorate, and “others from the KGB Investigation Department.” During the investigation, Bil’ak claimed that Grohman “was a close contact of Štrougal.” k-19,67. On Grohman’s subsequent trial, see: “Former Prague Minister on Spying Charge,” The Times (January 5, 1977); “Viele Mitarbeiter des BND haben Angst vor Verrat,” Die Welt (January 27, 1977).

43. k-19,77.

44. t-7,263,280,281. k-19,451.

45. Probably the KGB’s main source on Moczar’s active measures against Gierek and his bugging of much of the PUWP leadership was Szlachcic, later Polish Minister of the Interior. t-7,243.

46. For an analysis of the December 1970 protests, see Kurczewski, The Resurrection of Rights in Poland, ch. 5.

47. k-19,333.

48. k-19,322.

49. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 359-60.

50. t-7,243.

51. The other targets of cultivation assigned to BOGUN were W. Klimczak (not identified); the economist G. Nowakowski; the writer K. Busz, described as “leader of the Kraków intelligentsia”; and S. Kozinski, a photographer with “contacts in the Party and state apparatus” (k-19,415). The contact established by BOGUN with Bardecki was later continued by the illegal FILOSOV. Like others targeted by PROGRESS operations, Bardecki cannot be blamed for speaking to Western visitors whom he had no means of identifying as KGB illegals.

52. In addition to the seven illegals used for operations in East Germany, others were based there but operated elsewhere. k-19,399,415.

53. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the specific objectives of the illegals sent to Bulgaria.

54. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 354-5.

55. k-19,487.

56. k-19,455.

57. k-19,415,456.

58. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 350-2.

59. k-16,273; k-19,429. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details on the content of the reports.

60. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 359-60.

61. k-19,287.

62. k-19,264.

63. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 357-8. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, p. 77.

64. k-19,264.

65. k-19,270.

66. t-7,264.

67. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 82. A KGB file, apparently for the period 1976-7, gives the total size of Stasi personnel as “over 60,000” (k-19,271). This is consistent with documents in the Gauck [Stasi] Archive, which record a rise from 59,500 in 1975 to 75,000 in 1980.

68. k-19,273.

69. t-7,184.

70. k-19,430.

71. k-19,458.

72. k-27,78.

73. k-19,627.

74. k-27,243.

75. t-7,94.

76. k-19,209.