The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

82. On March 25, 1985, for example, the London residency received an urgent telegram asking for British reactions to Gorbachev’s meeting with the executive committee of the Socialist International. Sooner than report that the event had failed to excite great interest in Britain, the residency simply concocted a favorable reply without contacting any of its limited range of sources. (Recollection of Oleg Gordievsky, then resident-designate.)

83. See above, chapter 21.

84. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993; Viktor Makarov, “The West Had No Aggressive Plans against the USSR,” Express Chronicle (February 19, 1992), p. 5.

85. Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, ch. 19.

86. Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Ball and Windren, “Soviet Signals Intelligence (Sigint).”

87. Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” p. 726.

88. Andrew, “The Nature of Military Intelligence,” p. 5.

89. Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” pp. 727, 732 n. 6.

Chapter Twenty-two Special Tasks Part 1

1. Djilas, Tito, p. 29; Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 106-7; Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 399.

2. k-20,272; Ranković’s codename is in k-20,287.

3. Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 82-3, 105-6.

4. k-20,281.

5. k-20,276.

6. k-20,290,292. Tishkov’s cover name (Timofeyev) is given in Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 82-3, 105-6.

7. k-20,279.

8. k-20,289,290.

9. Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 84-5, 92, 95, 98-9, 105-6; Dedijer, Tito Speaks, p. 268.

10. k-20,292.

11. k-5,707.

12. Djilas, Rise and Fall, chs. 14, 15; Djilas, Tito, pp. 84-7; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 371-2. VAL is identified by Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, p. 338.

13. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 415-17.

14. See above, chapters 5, 6, and 10.

15. MGB report to Stalin, first published by Dmitri Volkogonov in Izvestia (June 11, 1993); reprinted in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 336-7, and “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,” p. 137.

16. MGB report to Stalin, first published by Dmitri Volkogonov in Izvestia (June 11, 1993).

17. “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,” p. 137.

18. Wolff, “Leadership Transition in a Fractured Bloc,” p. 1.

19. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 335-8.

20. k-13,267. Some examples of Grigulevich’s works, published under his own name, the pseudonym I. R. Lavretsky and the hybrid Grigulevich-Lavretsky, are included in the bibliography.

21. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 249, 252-3.

22. Khokhlov, In the Name of Conscience, part 3; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 430-1.

23. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.

24. t-7,267.

25. t-7,267.

26. Each target file (obektovoye delo) had to give the following information:

1. The role of the target in peacetime and wartime, and its place in the enemy’s military-industrial capabilities. Documents, photographs, films, maps and diagrams giving details on its location, work schedule, security system, personnel, neighbors, populated areas nearby and methods of approaching the target.

2. Detailed descriptions of the target’s vulnerable points, methods of attacking each of them, estimates of the likely damage, and the type of personnel to be used in sabotage operations (agents, illegals, etc.).

3. Opportunities to reconnoitre and sabotage the target. This section of the file contains individual reports (spravki) on every information source available on the target, and on each combat agent (agent-boyevik) selected for operations against it.

4. Details of the special equipment needed for operations against the target, the precise use to be made of it, dead drops, storage arrangements and the role of each of those entrusted with its use.

5. Arrangements for giving instructions to those responsible for attacking the target, together with the codewords for the “special action” to begin. (This part of the file was placed in a sealed package.)

If information on any of the subjects listed above was missing, a note was added to the file on the action being taken to obtain it. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, n. 2.

27. k-16,255.

28. t-7,311.

29. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

30. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

31. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 211-12.

32. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.

33. Barron, KGB, pp. 421-6. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 467.

34. The fullest account of Stashinsky’s career is in Anders, Murder to Order.

35. Anders, Murder to Order, p. 107.

36. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 468. See below, chapter 15.

37. Richard Beeston, “KGB Refused to Kill Khrushchev” [interview with Semichastny], The Times (December 23, 1997).

38. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 481-2.

39. The text of Khrushchev’s secret speech of August 3, 1961 did not come to light until 1993. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 252.

40. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.