The Third World War: August 1985

After each major war this century, a great empire has melted away. After the 1914-18 war, the defeated Austro-Hungarian empire. After the 1939-45 war, the victorious British empire. After the 1985 war, the defeated Soviet Union. That last is the only result of the late war that can be accounted as certain so far. For the rest, the most accurate prophecies could prove to be the ones that seem least likely now.

There is a nice story of a political prophet in Munich in 1928, who was asked to prophesy what would be happening to the burghers of his city in five, fifteen, twenty and forty years’ time. He began: ‘I prophesy that in five years’ time, in 1933, Munich will be part of a Germany that has just suffered 5 million unemployed and that is ruled by a dictator with a certifiable mental illness who will proceed to murder 6 million Jews.’

His audience said: ‘Ah, then you must think that in fifteen years’ time we will be in a sad plight.’

‘No,’ replied the prophet, ‘I prophesy that in 1943 Munich will be part of a Greater Germany whose flag will fly from the Volga to Bordeaux, from northern Norway to the Sahara.’

‘Ah, then you must think that in twenty years’ time, we will be mighty indeed.’

‘No, my guess is that in 1948 Munich will be part of a Germany that stretches only from the Elbe to the Rhine, and whose ruined cities will recently have seen production down to only 10 per cent of the 1928 level.’

‘So you think we face black ruin in forty years’ time?’

‘No, by 1968 I prophesy that real income per head in Munich will be four times greater than now, and that in the year after that 90 per cent of German adults will sit looking at a box in a corner of their drawing rooms, which will show live pictures of a man walking upon the moon.’

They locked him up as a madman, of course.

APPENDIX 1: British Defence Policy

Reorganizations of the British contribution to the land forces of Allied Command Europe — of which, over the years, there had been several — had always been represented by the British government of the day as improvements to BAOR’s effectiveness, even when their actual result could only be a reduction in combat capability. The 1974 reshuffle was no exception. The Northern Army Group (under British command, it should be remembered, and containing almost all the British ground troops assigned to NATO) had never at any time been fully adequate to its task — to repel a Warsaw Pact incursion into northern Germany. No one really believed that NORTHAG, even given time for its four constituent corps (Belgian, British, Dutch and German) to be brought up to war strength and moved forward to battle locations from barracks far in rear, would be able to hold up indefinitely a conventional attack on the scale to be expected, and there were virtually no reserves in depth to deal with a breakthrough. The 1974 reorganization of the British Army made a weak position weaker.

It was this lack of forces in depth which had led to the stationing of two US brigades in northern Germany — most valuable but still far from sufficient to restore tactical control once the NORTHAG front was pierced. The main significance of this move on the part of the Americans, though its purpose was essentially military, can be seen apolitical rather than tactical. It showed simply that the US did not accept the clear implication of British defence dispositions in Germany: that a failure to hold an invasion on the Demarcation Line must very soon be followed by nuclear action, which could lead to a strategic nuclear exchange; that provision for a land battle in depth was unnecessary. The Americans, in rather pointedly providing two combat brigades for the very purpose of defence in depth, in an area of mainly British responsibility, demonstrated that in a matter directly affecting the security of the United States under threat of strategic nuclear attack, they were not prepared to allow their choice of options to be dictated by British defence policy.

This did not pass unnoticed in Britain. The suggestion, given a generous airing in the British press, that Britain was continuing to rely on the US to do what Britain should really be doing for itself, was not particularly pleasing to the British public in a time of reviving national confidence. It was to play a small but not unimportant part in securing public approval for the increase in Britain’s contribution to the NATO ground forces, which will now be explored.