The Third World War: August 1985

It can now be seen that to meet a number of pressing requirements, including the need to relieve pressures in the Soviet Union no less than in the satellites, the Soviet leadership had brought to an advanced state contingency plans which, directly or indirectly, would put the Soviet Navy to the test. The time was coming to cash Gorshkov’s cheque. The plans involved in the first instance the use of naval and air forces in support of political operations designed to offset American reaction to savage, repressive measures within the Soviet empire and to secure advantages over the USA while it was still under a new and untried Administration. One of these plans hinged upon upsetting violently the political stability of the Persian Gulf; another on delaying the establishment of a stable political settlement in Southern Africa. Thus, the supply of Middle Eastern oil to the United States would immediately be in jeopardy, both at its source, in the Persian Gulf, and en route in tankers via the Cape of Good Hope.

On 29 December 1984 came news which electrified the world. An Iranian troop transport had been torpedoed and sunk, with heavy loss of life, by a Soviet submarine in the Strait of Hormuz; and an American intelligence ship had been subjected to missile attack off Aden.

Had Fleet Admiral Gorshkov still been in charge of the Soviet Navy it is doubtful whether things would so soon have begun to go wrong for the Russians. In the first place, he would have had sufficient prestige, courage and professional acumen to have demurred when given orders to send a submarine into the Persian Gulf approaches to sink an Iranian troop transport and immediately report the successful attack. The depth of water being insufficient for nuclear-powered submarine operations to be fully effective, the submarine had to be one of the diesel-driven ‘patrol’ type. But the Iranian Navy was known to have been equipped with up-to-date ASW forces, mainly of British origin, and to be well trained in their use. The prospect, therefore, of a successful submarine attack, followed by the safe withdrawal of the submarine and receipt of the all-important attack report, would not be good. By the same token, Gorshkov would have been unlikely to countenance a surprise missile attack upon an American intelligence ship. He would have reasoned that such an attack might invite reprisals against the Soviet Union’s own intelligence-gathering ships upon which so much depended; and that the US Navy could quickly concentrate a powerful force to escort the damaged ship to safety.

These dramatic events, when reported to the Soviet naval high command, had the effect of concentrating the comrades’ minds wonderfully. Despite the careful planning which had preceded the challenge to the United States, there was suddenly a feeling that events might get out of control. It was central to Soviet politico-military doctrine that military measures must directly and effectively serve some chosen political objective, whether on a worldwide or on a regional scale. Operations in the Middle East had been continuing, short of actual shooting by the great powers themselves, for many years — ever since the 1960s, in fact, soon after the failure of British nerve, French colonialism and American leadership became manifest at Suez. The rapid growth of the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov had been in response to two quite separate requirements, reflecting, as do so many aspects of Soviet policy, its dyadic nature. The first of these, as could be deduced from the Peace Programme promulgated at the Twenty-Fourth CPSU Congress, accepted as inevitable a degree of watchful co-operation between the Soviet and the Western blocs. The strategic balance would be maintained, nuclear war averted and detente promoted. The second need was competitive. In the Third World the Soviet Union had to compete strongly with the West for political influence, by supporting its friends and denying to the West any advantage that might be detrimental to the interest of the USSR or its clients. The Soviet Navy had to support both aspects of Soviet state policy. In theory this had seemed not only feasible but the strongest argument for naval expansion. In practice, how was it going to work out?