The Third World War: August 1985

The more recent Soviet naval activities in the Middle East formed part of the grand strategy formulated in 1983, when the probability had been foreseen (in a planning document given strictly limited circulation within the Kremlin) that the necessity would arise ‘to remove, by force if necessary, the NATO threat to the security of the USSR in Europe’. The intention of the Soviet Union to continue to take part, either directly or indirectly (but without inciting conflict with Western forces), in ‘fraternal wars’ had been reaffirmed. This policy, sanctified by Communist Party doctrine, could contribute to the achievement of two complementary strategic aims, one political in nature, the other military. Given the increasing dependence of the USA and her NATO allies on petroleum imported from the Persian Gulf, both its denial at source and its interdiction en route would be of great — perhaps decisive — advantage to the Soviet Union. The ‘fraternal’ aid currently being provided to the new United Arab Republic, and to the ‘People’s Liberation Armies’ in Southern Africa, supported these two objectives. But now the shooting had started. It was essential to retain the initiative. The closest possible co-ordination of diplomatic and naval activity was essential; and the responsibility had to be placed firmly where it belonged — with the Politburo. The Soviet Minister of Defence, Raskolnikov, was in complete accord with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Starsky. There had to be an immediate plenary meeting of the Main Military Council.

When this meeting took place, twenty-four hours later, it was attended by all the First Deputy and Deputy Ministers of Defence; also by the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces, air forces and strategic rocket forces, and, of course, of the main fleets. The ministers responsible for supplies, production of war materials and transport were present, and the Soviet Foreign Office was represented. Opening the meeting, the Minister of Defence briefly outlined the recent events. He then emphasized the need to keep the Politburo, and especially the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPSU, fully informed and properly advised. Second, the co-ordination, command and control of diplomatic activity and naval operations had to be fully effective. The balance had to be kept between actively supporting ‘fraternal’ forces and avoiding general war with the imperialists. To this end the Council ordered a number of studies to be made, for presentation within forty-eight hours. One of these studies, to be made by the naval staff, was ‘The Correlation of Naval Forces in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.

The naval paper, completed two days later, was predictable, not only in its comprehensiveness but also in its complexity. Despite Gorshkov’s single-minded advocacy of Soviet sea power throughout a quarter of a century as commander-in-chief, and the implementation of most of his major proposals, there remained many in high places who had never been fully convinced. Several influential members of the Military Council were civilians, landsmen of Russia to whom sea power remained an alien concept, and one not easily accommodated within Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Nor had the generals, as a body, ever been fully reconciled to what they saw as a disproportionate diversion of resources to naval expansion. The Soviet naval staff, therefore, took nothing for granted in reviewing the naval situation in the Middle East. The summary of facts, conclusions and recommendations which accompanied the paper was commendably terse, but the paper itself was not. It began with some ‘General Considerations’. These affirmed that:

1 The seas and oceans of the world remain, in spite of air, and improved land, transport, the ‘broad highway’ over which 90 per cent of the world’s commodities, minerals, manufactured products and petroleum are moved. In addition, 70 per cent of the population of the world live within thirty miles of the sea coast.

2 Economic necessity has forced the Soviet Union to develop, first, large fishing fleets [whaling fleets, also, until there were no more whales], then a large, and still increasing, merchant fleet. The former provided indispensable protein, the latter foreign currency, essential transportation between widely separated parts of the Soviet Union, and political influence worldwide.

3 Oceanographic research has enabled Soviet scientists to understand the sea and the exploration of the sea bed.