The Third World War: August 1985

Surprise was nowhere complete: NATO troops in forward positions were already alert. The expectation that an attack, however likely, would not take place just yet had some effect, at least initially, in reducing the effectiveness of protective and defensive measures in rear areas, but even here the numerous, widespread and carefully prepared strikes by under-cover parties met with gratifyingly little success. It was just not possible, as Kremlin planners had very sensibly realized, to prepare a sudden attack on so many points at once with complete surprise. They had therefore sought concealment in deception planning, particularly in terms of timing. It proved to be ineffective. A few discoveries of under-cover attacks on the very verge of delivery, together with other unmistakable signs of what was imminent, served to set off a general alert among Federal German police and territorial forces already standing by at short notice. Damage there was, even serious damage, but the first armed clash between the Warsaw Pact and the territorial defences of the Federal Republic resulted in at least 75 per cent failure and something of a boost to civil morale. (The attack on HQ NORTHAG noted above was, in spite of initial penetration of the HQ building and some casualties, a total failure, like very many others.)

Though Allied forces everywhere were already dispersed, as far as possible, in an anti-nuclear posture (with all its inconveniences), no nuclear attack was anywhere reported. Warsaw Pact forces, on the other hand, confident that nuclear release by the NATO defence was at this stage most unlikely, were able to operate with only that degree of dispersion required against conventional air attack, which was much less.

Chemical agents were used in the attack from the start, but only on some sectors of the front. They were not used against the two US corps, perhaps because USAREUR possessed integral and effective chemical offensive weapons of its own. US policy had consistently been that US troops would retaliate in kind if attacked with chemical agents but would not use them otherwise. The Soviet commanders seemed to have taken this threat seriously and did not use chemicals against any formation in CENTAG.

In the NORTHAG sector none of the national corps possessed a chemical offensive capability. This position had persisted in the 1980s despite the growing strength of the argument that possession of a retaliatory capability would be a relatively unsophisticated and economic means of discouraging recourse by the Soviet Union to chemical weapons, whose use by them would further add to the Warsaw Pact’s non-nuclear superiority. There was now widespread use by the enemy of chemicals to support attacks against NORTHAG, principally launched in BM-21 rockets. These equipments operated in battalion groups of eighteen which, when fired in unison, were able to land 720 rockets on a square kilometre within fifteen seconds. The warm weather was ideal for the use of non-persistent agents such as HCN. This has a hazard duration of only a few minutes at 10 °C in moderate wind conditions with rain, of at 15 °C in sunny conditions with a light breeze. Soldiers not wearing respirators within the target area died within a few minutes of inhaling the vapour. The agent evaporated so quickly that Soviet assault troops would be able to move through the target area with only minor precautions. Despite peacetime training, Allied casualties in forward areas as the offensive opened were considerable.

At the same time, major airfields were attacked with chemical agents (usually mustard, or G- or V-type nerve gases) delivered by missiles, each one of which could put down sufficient of a persistent agent to cause severe disruption over the whole airfield complex. Ground crew were forced to wear full personal protective equipment to carry out maintenance and aircraft refuelling and re-arming. This severely handicapped their performance and increased aircraft turn-round times significantly.

Major logistic installations and communication points, where large numbers of the civilians operating them had no protective equipment, received similar treatment. Physical removal of persistent agents was virtually impossible while further missile attacks maintained a high level of lethal contamination. Such attacks upon airfields and logistic installations caused more prolonged disruption than sustained high-explosive bombardment.

Even a minute quantity of a highly toxic agent such as HCN, either inhaled or absorbed through the skin, was capable of causing death within a few minutes unless prompt medical attention was available. Medical services soon overloaded with battle casualties were severely taxed to cope with casualties caused by chemicals as well.