At the northern end of the Central Region Bremen airfield, so recently, ironically enough, protected by a US brigade, was in Soviet hands. It had been seized by one of the very few fully successful fifth-column actions, followed up by airborne infantry. A Soviet air-portable division, under very strong air cover, was now building up on the airhead thus formed. Three divisions out of 2 Guards Tank Army, slowed down but not stopped by the action of covering forces which had been furnished by the Americans to strengthen the forward defences of the Dutch, were fighting their way towards the Bremen airhead through I Netherlands Corps. One Soviet division out of 2 Guards Tank Army had turned up northwards in the direction of Kiel, followed, it appeared, by two Polish divisions, one armoured, one motorized. The 6 Polish Airborne Division was also known to be concentrated in the north, with special deep penetration troops from Neuruppin, units from the East German Willi Sanger Special Services organization and naval specialists.
The city of Hamburg, masked by a strong Red Army force to the south of it across the Elbe, was apparently being bypassed for the present. The Hamburg
Refugee movement from the relatively thinly populated areas of north Niedersachsen was already considerable. There was here an unwelcome foretaste of what lay in store further south.
In the centre of the NORTH AG area a strong armoured column from what was almost certainly 3 Shock Army had been launched on a two-divisional front, with four more divisions in the follow-up. It was moving westwards, in the direction of Hannover. Movement behind it along the same axis was observed from 20 Guards Army.
On the Central Army Group front to the south of NORTHAG an armoured column from 8 Guards Army with two divisions up was driving at Frankfurt, which lay only 100 kilometres from the Demarcation Line, but with difficult country in the Thuringer Wald to be crossed on the way. Four more Soviet divisions were known to be following up the first two.
Further south on the CENTAG front another column, again with two divisions up and four following, almost certainly from 1 Guards Tank Army, was pressing towards Nurnberg.
Chemical attack, heavy in NORTHAG, not used in CENTAG, had a varying impact: the Americans, who did not have to face it, were, with the British, technically best prepared to meet it, the Germans and the British stood it best, the effect on the Belgians was mixed and that upon the Dutch on the whole rather bad.
The main result of chemical attack was less the infliction of casualties, which were never intolerably high after the initial attacks, than the severe constraint on physical activity occasioned by defensive precautions, particularly the wearing of respirators and cumbrous protective clothing. The performance of combat infantry was degraded under full precautions by as much as 60 per cent. Mobility was reduced in avoiding contaminated areas. The requirement for chemical reconnaissance took time and units were frequently forced for lack of it to fight in a contaminated environment. Similar constraints applied to headquarters. Staff officers under threat of attack had to work in protective equipment, including gloves and respirators, with a significant degradation in command and control.
On the opening day of the offensive Soviet ground-attack aircraft also used napalm against forward Allied units. Fortunately most were well spread out and casualties, where they occurred, although gruesome, were small in number. Attacks were also mounted against tanks and some tank losses resulted. Allied tank commanders had been taught to drive straight through any napalm attack and, generally speaking, tanks which continued to motor on in this way drove themselves out of trouble. The target against which napalm was used to greatest effect was soft-skinned, that is, unarmoured vehicles, which stood a poor chance of survival against it. Quite heavy casualties were sustained in soft-skinned transport in the opening days of the offensive.
Although Allied formations had no answer to napalm attacks other than to redouble their vigilance against low-flying aircraft, such attacks tended to lessen in frequency and intensity as the Russians found that the damage being caused, particularly against Allied tanks, did not warrant the high cost in aircraft. Although sporadic attacks continued throughout the following days the use of napalm was not regarded by the Allies as offering a major hazard.