The Third World War: August 1985

The British naval contribution to NATO had been augmented, during the period 1979-85, following a sudden, eleventh-hour awakening of public opinion to Britain’s extreme vulnerability to attack upon her seaborne trade and supplies — a vulnerability now felt almost as much by the other NATO countries in north-western Europe. The most important elements in the emergency naval programme were:

1 Three escort carriers. These were container ship hulls fitted with ‘ski-jump’ flight decks and containerized aircraft control and operations modules. Carrying a mix of V/STOL fighter-strike-reconnaissance aircraft, and ASW helicopters, these 28-knot ships, built to merchant ship specifications, were good value for money.

2 Four additional improved Sheffield-class fleet frigates.

3 Twelve corvettes of a new type, for fast patrol ship duties.

4 Six additional mine counter-measure ships.

5 Five small patrol (diesel-electric) submarines.

This naval construction programme was feasible, despite Great Britain’s poor economic performance in the 1970s, because her shipbuilding industry, other than in designated warship building yards, was very short of orders and the extra jobs were warmly welcomed. It seemed a preferable alternative to building merchant ships, at a loss, for Soviet satellite countries, to be employed in cut-throat competition against the merchant fleets of the United Kingdom. The shape and size of the Royal Navy in the mid-1980s was appropriate, therefore, to the two main functions of the UK maritime task, namely, sea-use management and combat with hostile forces. This pattern had become accepted, also, in the other NATO navies, so that the mix of forces achieved overall had gradually moved towards the optimum.

The strategy of SACLANT, as it had evolved under a series of most able incumbents of the post, by 1985 comprised three main elements: first, to maintain in readiness the US Navy’s strategic nuclear forces, and ensure that no Soviet operational development could upset the strategic nuclear balance; second, to act, with his conventional forces, as vigorously as possible to reduce the threat from Soviet conventional forces to NATO’s seaborne supplies and reinforcements; third, to give direct assistance, as appropriate and feasible, to both SACEUR and JACWA in their operations.

SACLANT’s assessment of the combat capability of various types of naval and air force had led him to base his concept of operations on the judgement that the supersonic homing, guided or programmed missile, whether launched from land, surface warship, submarine or aircraft, was the main danger to naval forces and shipping at sea. But it was a danger to which some effective counters were already in operational service. The hoary ‘axioms of action’ — above all surprise, concentration and economy of force — had to be borne in mind. Owing to the inability of submarines to operate submerged in large groups, in the way, for example, the U-boat ‘wolf-packs’ were able to operate on the surface in the Second World War, it would today be difficult for a submarine attack to saturate the anti-missile defences of a well-ordered escort or support group. Maritime strike aircraft, on the other hand, could carry out a heavily concentrated attack, which might temporarily overwhelm the defences.

It was with these considerations in mind that SACLANT’s operations were planned. It was essential, as a basis for them, to exploit two capabilities, which had been developed in recent years, to provide early warning of impending attacks. The first of these concerned submarines. The knowledge of Soviet submarine dispositions and movements painstakingly built up in peacetime had been augmented by the use of the surface-towed array surveillance system (STASS), operated in a number of suitably stationed patrol ships. These monitored the noise made by submarines underway, especially when they exceeded modest speeds. The information so obtained could be fed into the total submarine surveillance system, with corresponding improvement in its reliability and comprehensiveness. The second important system was the airborne warning and control system (AWACS), operated in large patrol aircraft. This could provide long-range warning of low-flying aircraft or missile attack, and hence help to offset, to some extent, the danger of defences being overwhelmed by the weight of a surprise missile onslaught.