The Third World War: August 1985

The best that NATO could do had been to set up NATO Shipping Councils at the world’s main ports. These consisted of representatives from the shipping and forwarding agents of NATO countries, as these existed in each place, together with diplomatic representatives of the nations concerned. Communication between the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping and NATO naval authorities made it possible for NATO to organize and protect its shipping outside as well as inside the NATO area. This was no substitute for the worldwide system of naval commands and shipping control officers by means of which Great Britain and her maritime allies had conducted the ‘sea affair’ in 1939-45, but it was better than nothing. Better, indeed, than the over-centralized Soviet system. The advantage of flexibility and initiative enjoyed by the NATO Shipping Councils was in stark contrast to the difficulty the Soviet Union’s representatives had in obtaining permission to act, as they so often felt that the situation demanded, in the light of local knowledge of rapidly changing circumstances.

The second set of differences, in the general conditions of the war at sea, between the Second World War and the Third, was technical. The most important new factor was the advent of nuclear-powered submarines. Able to go two or three times round the world without having to refuel or replenish, and not having to show any part of themselves above water (except momentarily for navigation or communication purposes), these were potent instruments of sea power. That is to say, they were potent instruments of sea power in the negative sense, namely, of the power to deny the use of the sea to a hostile country or coalition. To the positive side of sea power, submarines could contribute a good deal less. A French naval officer had aptly described nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines as ‘myopic and brutal’. In placing such reliance upon a huge submarine force as the main instrument of her putative sea power, the Soviet Union underlined, one might think, its own ‘myopic and brutal’ character. For the quintessence of sea power, exemplified par excellence

by the British Empire in its hey-day, is the positive contribution which it can make to peaceful and growing international trade. Maritime strike aircraft, although the reverse of myopic, were if anything more brutal than submarines. The latter at least could operate, in certain circumstances, with due regard for humanity, using minimum force and helping survivors to safety. This a shore-based aircraft could never do. In 1985, therefore, the Soviet Union at last had to face certain facts. The possession of enormous ship-sinking power, together with a huge merchant marine directly controlled from Moscow, was no substitute for the carrying power of the West’s ships, freely co-ordinated, under the protection of the Allied navies of the maritime governments whose flags they flew.

This realization did not come easily or quickly to those members of the Politburo and the CPSU who had backed Admiral Gorshkov’s line for so long. Why is it, they demanded to know, that every single Soviet or Warsaw Pact ship has been ordered into port? What is the Soviet Navy doing? Supporting the Red Army’s operations in central and northern Europe, yes. Supporting ‘fraternal’ wars in the Middle East, yes. But what about the seaborne supplies needed by our socialist brothers in East and Southern Africa, in West Africa and the Caribbean? As to the Mediterranean, why is it that our shipping, and that of so-called neutral and friendly governments, remains immobilized?

‘Do not be impatient, comrades,’ replied the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. ‘Once our gallant Red Army has imposed peace in north-west Europe, and the Americans have come to the negotiating table, you will see how Soviet sea power can become paramount, even as our armies have triumphed on land. You will see that it will be the Soviet Navy which has gained the victory.’

CHAPTER 17: The Battle of the Atlantic

The first naval action of the Third World War was between two submarines, one British and the other Soviet. They met in the Shetland-Faroes gap, which, with its extension to Iceland and beyond to Greenland, would be the main naval battleground of the war. The following account of what happened, which sets the scene for the war at sea, is taken from Submarines at War by J. Heller, published by Sidgwick and Jackson, London, in 1987.