If there were significant, though not fully acknowledged, differences between the records of the two governments on domestic issues, there were open, even strident differences on questions of foreign policy. Gladstone had never been a Palmerstonian. He was always anxious to avoid the resort to force, and he put his trust not in national prejudices but in an enlightened public opinion in Europe as well as in Britain. His object was justice rather than power. In practice, however, he often gave the impression of a man who vacillated and could not act firmly. Disraeli, on the other hand, was willing to take risks to enhance British prestige and to seek to profit from, rather than to moralize about, foreign dissensions. His first ventures in “imperialism”—a speech at the Crystal Palace in 1872, the purchase of the Suez Canal shares in 1875, and the proclamation of the queen as “Empress of India”—showed that he had abandoned the view, popular during the middle years of the century, that colonies were millstones around the mother country’s neck. But these moves did not involve him in any European entanglements, nor did the costly, if brilliantly led, campaigns of Maj. Gen. Frederick Roberts in Afghanistan (1878–80) and the annexation of the Transvaal in South Africa in 1877.
It was the Middle Eastern crisis of 1875–78 that produced the liveliest 19th-century debate on foreign policy issues. In May 1876 Disraeli rejected overtures made by Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany to deal jointly with the Ottoman Empire, which was faced with revolt in Serbia. His pro-Turkish sympathies irritated many Liberals, and, after Turkey had gone on to suppress with great violence a revolt in Bulgaria in 1876, the Liberal conscience was stirred, and mass meetings were held in many parts of the country. Gladstone, who had gone into retirement as Liberal leader in 1875, was slower to respond to the issue than many of his followers, but, once roused, he emerged from retirement, wrote an immensely influential pamphlet on the atrocities, and led a public campaign on the platform and in the press. For him the Turks were “inhuman and despotic,” and, whatever the national interests involved, Britain, in his view, should do nothing to support them. Disraeli’s calculations concerned strategic and imperial necessities rather than ideals of conduct, and his suspicions were justified when the Russians attacked Turkey in April 1877. Opinion swung back to his side, and in 1878 Disraeli sent a British fleet to the Dardanelles. London was seized by war fever—the term
Economy and society
Although the Industrial Revolution traditionally has dominated accounts of change over the course of this period, recent research has emphasized the uneven and complex nature of this change. Nevertheless, over the course of the 19th century, the rise of manufacturing industry was striking, with the decisive shift occurring in the first three decades of the century. In 1801, 22 percent of the active British workforce was employed in manufacturing, mining, and construction, while 36 percent was involved in agriculture; by 1851, manufacturing, mining, and construction had increased to 40 percent, while agriculture had dropped to 21 percent. By 1901, agriculture had fallen even farther, to only 9 percent.