When China Rules the World

The lack of any serious European diplomatic or military presence in East Asia means that, unlike the United States, which remains the key arbiter of security in the region, Europe has no major geopolitical conflicts of interest with China. When it comes to Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula or the US-Japanese alliance, all critical issues of US concern, Europe is no more than a spectator. It has no involvement in the United States ’ bilateral alliance system in the region. As a result, Chinese-European relations are unencumbered by such considerations. [1143] The nearest such issue has been the European embargo on the supply of arms to China, which was introduced after Tiananmen Square and which China has lobbied hard to get lifted. Although the European Union eventually obliged in 2005, it rapidly reversed the decision in response to huge pressure from the United States, which turned the issue into something akin to a vote of confidence in the Atlantic Alliance. Only by making it an article of faith in the West did the US manage to hold the line, suggesting that Europe may, up to a point, be prepared to think for itself when it comes to its relations with China. [1144] This is not to suggest that in the long run Europe is likely to detach itself from the United States in favour of China – that is virtually inconceivable – but the reaction of key European nations like Germany and France to the American invasion of Iraq showed that much of Europe was no longer prepared slavishly to follow the US. It is reasonable to surmise that relations between the US and Europe are likely to improve significantly during the Obama presidency, though they are unlikely to return to the intimacy of the Cold War period. With the rise of China and the importance of the Middle East, the transatlantic relationship is no longer pivotal for the US in the way that it once was: rather than being a universal relationship in the mould of the Cold War, the nature of cooperation is likely to vary according to the issue involved. [1145] As the focus of global affairs shifts towards the relationship between the United States and China, there is a possibility that Europe might become a freer spirit than previously, and not necessarily always prepared to do the US ’s bidding. But it is important not to exaggerate any such scenario. Europe is far more likely to take the side of the United States than China ’s in geopolitical arguments, whether it be Darfur, trade talks or climate change. For a variety of reasons, historical, cultural, ethnic and economic, Europe is likely to remain very closely wedded to the US in the world that is unfolding.

THE RISING SUPERPOWER AND THE DECLINING SUPERPOWER

While the domestic debate in the United States might often suggest the contrary, ever since the Mao-Nixon rapprochement of 1972 and the subsequent establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1979, the relationship between China and US has been characterized for almost four decades by stability and continuity. [1146] Although it has been through many phases – the axis against the Soviet Union, the reform period and modernization, Tiananmen Square and its aftermath, China’s rapid growth and its turn outwards in the late 1990s, the rise of Chinese nationalism, and of course a succession of US presidents from Nixon and Reagan to Carter and Clinton – the relationship has remained on an even keel, with the United States gradually granting China access both to its domestic market and the institutions of the international system, and China in return tempering and dovetailing its actions and behaviour in deference to American attitudes. The rationale that has been used to justify the US position has been through various iterations during the course of these different phases, but there has been no shrinking from the underlying approach. It may not be immediately obvious why the US ruling elite has been so consistently supportive of this position, but the key reason surely lies in its origins. The Mao-Nixon rapprochement was reached in the dark days of the Cold War and represented a huge geopolitical coup for the United States in its contest with the Soviet Union. That created a sense of ongoing loyalty and commitment to the relationship with China that helped to ensure its endurance.