There are two possible outcomes in terms of their future relationship. First, China could accept that South Asia is, in effect, India ’s rightful sphere of influence. In practice, this seems rather unlikely. Chinese influence in the region is too extensive and too well established for it to be rolled back or for China to concede that this should happen. It is an outcome which both China and its formal and informal allies in the region would resist. Furthermore, given China ’s growing strength relative to India, it is probably less likely than at any time in the last half-century. Second, India could accept that China ’s presence in South Asia is permanent and resolve to accommodate itself to this reality by, for example, conceding that an Indian- Chinese partnership is necessary for handling security problems in the region. In the longer run, this could even mean that India acquiesces in China ’s pre-eminence in South Asia as well as in East Asia. [1123]
In this context, a major Chinese objective is to prevent the creation of any barriers which might impede the long-term growth of its presence, role and influence in Asia; other examples of this are its resistance to the widening of the US-Japan alliance and its refusal to accept any multilateral approaches or solutions to the sovereignty of the disputed islands in the South China Sea. [1124] The latter scenario – Indian acceptance of China ’s role in South Asia – would be consonant with this objective. In reality, of course, India has been obliged over many years to adapt – de facto at least – to the growing power of China in South Asia, so elements of this scenario already exist in tacit form. [1125]China ’s rapid economic growth has underpinned its growing strength in South Asia. In 1950 the per capita income of India was around 40 per cent greater than that of China; by 1978 they were roughly on a par. By 1999, however, China ’s was not far short of being twice that of India ’s. [1126]
Furthermore, although India ’s growth rate has steadily risen in recent years, it still remains significantly below that of China: in other words, China is continuing to extend its economic lead over India. Although India enjoys some economic advantages over China, notably its prowess in software, the software industry only accounts for a very small proportion of its labour force. Manufacturing accounted for a little over a fifth of India’s GDP in 2003 compared with over a half of China’s, while 59 per cent of India’s population was still employed in agriculture in 2001 compared with less than half in China. [1127] China ’s economy is now three times as large as that of India, [1128] with the gap extending. Even if India ’s growth rate overtakes that of China, it would take a very long time for the Indian economy to become as large as the Chinese. In short, China ’s economic power is likely to overshadow that of India at least in the medium term, if not much longer.