Where the Iron Crosses Grow

With Fort Stalin taken, Hansen turned to deal with Sector IV and the stubborn 95th Rifle Division, as well as Coastal Battery No. 30. Kapitokhin’s 95th Rifle Division had built strong defensive positions atop a prominent ridge just 600 yards east of Captain Aleksandr’s fortified command post known as Bastion I. Soviet troops still held the north–south stretch of antitank ditch in this sector and they had an advantage in terms of holding the high ground – any German movement brought instant fire. Nor did the introduction of Hitzfeld’s IR 213 improve the German situation in this sector, and the regiment suffered over 400 casualties between June 11 and June 13, which was half as much as they lost at Perekop in September 1941. Indeed, the Soviet 90th and 161st Rifle Regiments kept repeatedly counterattacking Hitzfeld’s positions atop Haccius Ridge and even succeeded in pushing them back several hundred yards on June 13. In response, II. and III./IR 437 from the 132. Infanterie-Division mounted a night attack on June 14 that succeeded in capturing the Neuhaus Heights from the 241st Rifle Regiment and threatened to outflank the ridge defenses protecting Aleksandr’s Coastal Battery No. 30. Obergefreiter Gottlob H. Bidermann, serving as a Panzerjäger in IR 437, was part of this push against the 95th Rifle Division’s flank and described how “each foot of ground was hotly contested in attempts to capture the commanding Neuhaus heights.” He also mentioned that, “the dead from both sides lay thick in the ravines and due to the danger from enemy snipers they could not be removed or recovered for burial. The oppressive heat soon bore with it the sickly sweet smell of decaying flesh.”⁶³ Military historians rarely mention how a battlefield smells, but to the infantrymen on both sides at Sevastopol, the stench of unburied corpses was certainly one of their most poignant memories.

Once the Neuhaus Hill was captured, the 132. Infanterie-Division committed elements of IR 436 to exploit this success by pushing further west toward the next ridgeline. Oberfeldwebel Popp, from 10./IR 436, was in the lead assault squad and he encountered a deeply entrenched position with 13 concrete-and-earth bunkers. Initially, the Soviets were surprised by this sudden appearance of German troops and their resistance was ineffective. It was a confused pre-dawn action, fought at close quarters, and Popp soon found himself isolated from his company and in the middle of an alerted Soviet position. Gathering up a mixed unit of German troops who had fought their way into the Soviet trench system, including Obergefreiter Mersch from 2./IR 436, Popp tried to hold the position until German reinforcements arrived, but the Soviets counterattacked in force and overwhelmed them. Both Popp and Mersch were reported missing in action.⁶⁴ During the course of Operation Störfang, AOK 11 reported over 1,500 of its troops as missing in action.

Although most Soviet troops were still fighting tenaciously, there was an increasing number of Red Army soldiers deserting to the enemy after the fall of Fort Stalin. German intelligence officers were quick to note that many of the Ukrainians, Georgians, Chechens, and other minority recruits from the Caucasus were less than enthusiastic to serve in the Red Army or sacrifice themselves for Sevastopol. On the night of June 14/15, Serzhant Nikolai Voroshun, a flak soldier, crossed the lines and provided a great deal of information about the location of the remaining Soviet artillery in the sector, which assisted LIV Armeekorps in preparing its push westward toward Coastal Battery No. 30.⁶⁵ Kapitokhin had responded to Lindemann’s economy-of-force move of withdrawing all but his reconnaissance troops from the positions north of the Bel’bek River by doing exactly the same – which allowed him to concentrate all his infantry south of the river. If Manstein had another regiment available, this would have been an excellent time to strike the thinned-out left flank of Sector IV, but he did not. Instead, it was Petrov who sent some of his last reserves – the half-strength 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 7th Naval Infantry Brigade – to reinforce the weakened front line near the Neuhaus. By June 15, Kapitokhin had six battalions deployed on a 1¼-mile-wide north–south front, from the bombed-out artillery barracks to the Bel’bek River, against Hansen’s nine battalions.