Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Hansen began “softening up” Fort Stalin on the afternoon of June 12 with a series of Stuka attacks, followed by 11 42cm rounds – which knocked out three of the four antiaircraft guns. In the evening, the 22. Infanterie-Division concentrated all its guns against Fort Stalin, supplemented by a battery each of 30.5cm and 21cm mortars. The bombardment also struck Fort Volga, a Soviet antiaircraft machine-gun position located further south on the same hill as Fort Stalin. Wolff selected Choltitz’s IR 16 to assault Fort Stalin since this regiment had consistently displayed great tactical aggressiveness and ingenuity in overcoming fortified positions since the fighting at Perekop nine months before. Despite the loss of five company commanders since June 7, Choltitz still had 813 combat-ready troops available and his men had been given a brief rest in reserve. However, Choltitz decided not to employ all his troops for this attack, but only the best leaders and troops, in two carefully tailored assault battalions. He selected Major Johannes Arndt’s I./IR 16 as his main effort; in addition to 105 infantrymen in three companies, Arndt was provided with five StuG III assault guns from Hauptmann Cäsar’s 1./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, 35 engineers from Oberleutnant Heyer’s 3./Pionier-Bataillon 744, and a Panzerjäger team with two 3.7cm Pak guns. Hauptmann Hermann-Albert Schrader’s III./IR 16 would follow and support Arndt’s battalion with two infantry companies and one machine-gun company, totaling 89 infantrymen and 20 engineers. Thus the assault force comprised only 194 infantrymen and 55 engineers.⁵⁹ Choltitz also formed a fire-support Kampfgruppe with the machine gunners of Oberleutnant Nahrwold’s 14. Kompanie and regimental 7.5cm and 15cm infantry guns to suppress the enemy mortars suspected to be located in the so-called Wolf’s Ravine southeast of Fort Stalin. After briefing Arndt and Schrader on the attack plan, Choltitz moved with two of his battalions to an assembly area near the train station, while the heavy artillery was pounding Fort Stalin during the afternoon of July 12.

German artillery continued to pound Fort Stalin during the night of June 12/13. At 0300hrs on June 13, Choltitz ordered his two assault battalions to begin moving toward the hill. The plan was for Arndt’s battalion to infiltrate up the hillside in small groups, but soldiers from 1st Battalion/1165th Rifle Regiment were alert, and detected them. The Red Army soldiers responded with flares, then automatic-weapons fire at the intruders. Under the glare of the dangling pyrotechnics, they also called for mortar fire from the battery hidden in the Wolf’s Ravine. Arndt’s soldiers began to suffer heavy casualties – including his two lead company commanders – so he shifted westward to avoid the worst of the enemy fire, but ran into Schrader’s battalion in the dark. The two battalions became mixed up, as often happens in a night attack, and the situation became very confused. Via radio, Arndt requested that Choltitz use Nahrwold’s fire-support group to suppress the enemy mortars and machine gunners, but they were not successful. Yet this was one of those critical moments where the training of the German small-unit leaders really paid off. Sorting out the two battalions while under fire, the remaining officers and sergeants reorganized assault groups and closed in on the antiaircraft battery at the top of the hill. Cäsar’s assault guns moved up the hill too, with infantry moving alongside and behind. The Soviet troops bravely defended their positions, but rather passively, letting the Germans come to them.