Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Hansen’s corps had achieved remarkable success in the first three days of the ground offensive. The only really discordant note came from the 24. Infanterie-Division, which had consistently underperformed, while suffering excessive casualties. Generalleutnant Hans von Tettau’s 24. Infanterie-Division had fought a nearly private battle with Kolomiets’ ostensibly elite 25th Rifle Division Chapaevskaya. The terrain in this sector was very hilly and wooded, which made tactical movements slow and costly, and greatly aided the defense. Nor had Tettau’s division been allocated as much artillery or air support, since they were assigned only a supporting role. Yet there was little doubt that the Chapaevskaya had given Tettau’s division a bloody nose.

What was the condition of the frontline infantry units on each side after three days of intensive combat? Most infantrymen had got by on only a few hours of sleep in the past 72 hours, and poor-quality sleep at that, although experienced troops could sleep in the bottom of trenches or bunkers despite ongoing bombardments. As Obergefreiter Gottlob Bidermann in IR 437 remembered, “one lived only on cigarettes, cold coffee, tea, and the sparse battle rations that were issued daily to those in the foremost lines. It was impossible to wash regularly or to shave.”⁵⁶ Thus, filthy, sleep-deprived, and underfed troops were expected to continue expending enormous amounts of energy and maintain combat alertness, day after day. A battle like Sevastopol became an endurance contest, won by the side with the best stamina. While Guz’s 345th Rifle Division had not yet suffered heavy losses, Laskin’s 172nd Rifle Division had been broken into pieces and was only fighting as uncoordinated company and battalion-size battle groups. Potapov’s 79th NIB had lost roughly half its strength but was still holding the line near the Forsthaus, along with a battalion from the 2nd Perekop NIR. In Sector IV, the 95th Rifle Division had been forced to reform its flank into an L-shaped defense, but was still solid despite the destruction of one of its battalions. Soviet troops were still fighting tenaciously and the Germans had taken only 1,509 prisoners in this area. On the German side, some accounts have attempted to depict the German infantry as burnt-out after a few days of combat, but their losses – while heavy – were not unexpected. Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps suffered 6,024 casualties, including 1,383 dead or missing, or about 13 percent losses from its starting strength of 45,500 combat troops.⁵⁷ Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division, which had been rebuilt to nearly full strength before the battle, still had over 11,600 troops in the line. Hansen’s main concern was with the understrength 132. Infanterie-Division, which was unable to break through the 95th Rifle Division’s defenses in front of Coastal Battery No. 30. In order to reinvigorate this effort, Hansen brought up Oberst Otto Hitzfeld’s Infanterie-Regiment 213 from reserve; once again, Hitzfeld would be employed to spearhead a critical attack. Despite heavy casualties, both sides’ troops still had plenty of fight left in them.

The battle slowed down on June 10 as Hansen redistributed and reorganized his forces, but Buhse’s IR 47 was able to gain some ground in conjunction with the 50. Infanterie-Division near the Forsthaus. Hansen adopted an economy-of-force stance against the Soviet Sector IV, bringing the entire 132. Infanterie-Division and Hitzfeld’s regiment to crush the 95th Rifle Division’s forces south of the Bel’bek River while leaving only reconnaissance troops to screen the 2-mile-wide front against the Soviet positions still north of the river. It would have been prudent for Petrov to order Kapitokhin to pull his 95th Rifle Division back toward Coastal Battery No. 30 and abandon the positions north of the river, which now served no purpose, but he was unwilling to voluntarily cede ground to the enemy. Instead, Petrov believed that Hansen’s divisions were spent and overextended and that a major counterattack could retake much of the lost ground. Soviet tactical reporting was often flagrantly dishonest at this stage of the war, in an effort to conceal setbacks from superiors, and Petrov apparently accepted exaggerated reports from his frontline divisions. Whereas Hansen and Manstein were observing the battlefield every day from observation posts like the “Eagle’s Nest,” Petrov was out of touch in his distant bunker.