Where the Iron Crosses Grow

On the morning of June 11, a series of Soviet counterattacks did develop against Hansen’s frontline divisions. Potapov’s 79th NIB attacked the 50. Infanterie-Division’s positions near the Forsthaus and some naval infantrymen managed to penetrate 600 yards before being stopped by German artillery fire and the assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190. Although the armored train Zhelezniakov supported the attack with its three 76mm guns, coordination with two artillery regiments assigned to support the attack was ineffective because the naval infantrymen lacked tactical radios. Guz committed two battalions from his reserve regiments, the 1165th and 1167th Rifle Regiments, but their efforts to advance toward the Mekenzievy Mountain station were repulsed. Kapitokhin staged a two-battalion counterattack against the 132. Infanterie-Division’s IR 437, which gained a little ground, but otherwise changed little. However, the main result of the disjointed Soviet counterattacks – none of which were properly coordinated – was that Soviet infantrymen emerging out in the open were exposed to German air attacks and artillery fire. Richthofen’s pilots scattered antipersonnel bombs over attacking Soviet units, causing heavy casualties. Once the Soviet counterattacks were spent, Hansen ordered Wolff to hit Guz’s reeling division, and Buhse’s IR 47 managed to advance nearly half a mile, while Choltitz’s IR 16 got close to Fort Stalin. Buhse’s forward units were now about a mile from the northern shore of Severnaya Bay and even closer to the railroad tunnel next to a road loop known as the Serpentine; inside the tunnel were a number of headquarters units, artillerymen, engineers, and supply troops. At great cost, Hansen had succeeded in driving a deep wedge into Petrov’s Sector III.

Despite much talk of “fortress Sevastopol” for propaganda purposes, Petrov’s remaining defenses north of Severnaya Bay were really just a ramshackle collection of fortified hilltops, badly knocked-about coastal batteries, and archaic forts left over from the Crimean War. Guz’s 345th Rifle Division’s defense was now based upon a bevy of positions known as “Stalin,” “Volga,” “Siberia,” “Molotov,” “GPU,” and “Ural.” Virtually none of these positions were designed to repel ground attacks, and certainly not from the north. Choltitz’s IR 16 had attacked the so-called “Fort Stalin” in December 1941 and failed, but that was due to fading German strength rather than the strength of the position itself. Hansen’s next step was to eliminate Fort Stalin, from which Soviet observers were directing fire on the train station below, and then to move against Coastal Battery No. 30.

Ironically, Lieutenant Nikolai A. Vorobyev, the heroic commander of the 365th Antiaircraft Battery atop the 60-yard-high hill known by the Germans as Fort Stalin, was seriously wounded by artillery fragments on the first day of the German ground offensive and evacuated. He was replaced by Lieutenant Ivan S. Pyanzin. The battery consisted of four 76mm antiaircraft guns, mounted on concrete pads, but without overhead cover. The battery had been fortified with a small concrete command bunker in the center of a circular perimeter and three concrete pillboxes with machine guns on its eastern and southern perimeter, while its 60 personnel were provided with underground shelters and slit trenches. Furthermore, the troops were almost all veterans, and deliberately included a number of handpicked communists. A 4-yard-wide barbed-wire obstacle belt surrounded the position, as well as some wooden antipersonnel mines. For close support, Guz assigned the 1st Battalion/1165th Rifle Regiment to defend the approaches to the battery. While the 365th Antiaircraft Battery was fortified, it certainly was no fort, since it did not have allround protection. Dorahad fired six 80cm rounds at the battery but without much effect; one round fell within 38 yards of one of the flak-gun positions, but the others missed by 140–280 yards.⁵⁸