Where the Iron Crosses Grow

When he learned about the lack of success by XXX Armeekorps and the heavy losses suffered by the 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division, Manstein ordered Fretter-Pico to cease any further such piecemeal attacks and to concentrate his forces to seize limited objectives. Yet Fretter-Pico failed to form a Schwerpunkt in any one sector and spent the next three days committing the 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division to probing attacks against the 381st Rifle Regiment’s positions around the Blagodat State Farm. Meanwhile, Fretter-Pico’s other two infantry divisions sat on their hands for the first four days of Störfang. After four days of indecisive fighting, XXX Armeekorps had suffered over 1,000 casualties and seized none of its objectives. Novikov’s troops had stood up very well during these opening days, inflicting heavy losses and mounting spirited counterattacks that knocked the Germans back on their heels.

However, by June 11, Manstein reckoned that it was time for Fretter-Pico’s corps to begin larger-scale offensive operations. Thus, Fretter-Pico attacked the center of Novikov’s front near Kamary with three battalions (I. and III./IR 401 from Sander’s 170. Infanterie-Division and I./IR 266 from Müller-Gebhard’s 72. Infanterie-Division), supported by eight assault guns from 2./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 249 and 13 Pz IIIJ tanks from Panzer-Abteilung (FL) 300. The attack on the right by I./IR 401 near Chapel Hill went surprisingly well and succeeded in capturing Ruin Hill from the 602nd Rifle Regiment. The two-battalion attack further south gained a few hundred yards before being stopped by counterattacks from the 782nd Rifle Regiment. By day’s end, the Germans had formed two small salients north and south of the fortified town of Kamary, which was held by two battalions from the 778th Rifle Regiment. The next day, Müller-Gebhard added in fresh troops from his IR 124 to reinforce the concentric attack against Kamary, which was being attacked from the east and the south. Martinek also focused most of XXX Armeekorps’ artillery against Kamary, which inflicted significant losses on the 778th Rifle Regiment.

Novikov decided that the 778th Rifle Regiment was in poor shape and was uncertain that they could hold Kamary. This may have been one of those cases where ethnic prejudices against the combat capabilities of Caucasian troops helped to shape tactical decisions. In any case, Novikov decided upon the risky maneuver of a relief-in-place: he would pull out the 778th Rifle Regiment during the night of June 12/13 and replace them with steadier troops from his flank regiments. This was a difficult task for even veteran troops, and it did not go well in this case. The Germans detected movement around Kamary, and Müller-Gebhard immediately launched an attack at 0430hrs with his IR 124. The Soviets had emplaced a dense obstacle belt in front of Kamary, consisting of barbed wire and mines, but an obstacle’s value is greatly reduced if it is not covered by fire. For reasons unclear, the 778th Rifle Regiment did not leave sufficient rearguards to cover the obstacles, and the pioneers attached to IR 124 were able to create lanes through the obstacles by 0700hrs. German artillery fire pounded the town, disrupting the Soviet relief-in-place. Jäger-Regiment 49 also launched a supporting attack against the 381st Rifle Regiment positions on Vermillion Hill, southwest of Kamary, which prevented them from transferring troops to help the 782nd Rifle Regiment. Under great pressure, the center of Novikov’s line began to buckle.