Fretter-Pico requested Fliegerkorps VIII to make a concerted effort against Novikov’s reserve positions at Fort Kuppe, which made it difficult for the Soviets to reinforce the threatened sector. The Germans knew from prisoner interrogations that the command posts of both the 602nd and 782nd Rifle Regiments were located at Fort Kuppe, which was about 1,300 yards behind the frontline. By late afternoon on June 13, with the Soviet defenses greatly weakened and their command and control disrupted, Fretter-Pico put all his cards on the table. North of Kamary, Sanders massed all three battalions of IR 401 against the 602nd Rifle Regiment defending the causeway road, just west of Ruin Hill. IR 401 was supplemented with assault guns, Pz IIIJ tanks, and a small mobile group comprised of bicycle infantry and a few armored cars. At 1600hrs he began his attack. Even though the 602nd Rifle Regiment was a veteran unit on good defensive terrain, it was quickly overwhelmed and forced to fall back. At this point, chaos and confusion took over the battle. Novikov probably tried to get his defeated regiments to withdraw to their secondary positions and form a new front, but troops were moving rearward with little direction. Sanders’s mobile group aggravated the situation by aggressively pushing over half a mile down the causeway road, which turned the retreat of the 602nd Rifle Regiment into a stampede. Sensing a breakthrough, Sanders committed his reserve – II./IR 266 – to pursue the broken enemy. Adding to the Soviet discomfiture, the 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division and the Romanian mountain troops mounted supporting attacks against the flanks of the breakthrough zone. Amazingly, II./IR 266 reached the outskirts of Fort Kuppe by 1745hrs and began to methodically clear the position.74
Novikov’s requested air support and the VVS-ChF flew some strafing runs against the Germans, but it was too late. By nightfall, both Kamary and Fort Kuppe had fallen and Fretter-Pico’s assault troops had created a deep salient in Novikov’s lines. Hundreds of Soviet troops were captured in this debacle.Novikov could take solace in the fact that his flanks still held firm: the 381st Rifle Regiment on Rose Hill and the Blagodat State Farm in the south, and Zhidilov’s 7th Naval Infantry Brigade on the high ground overlooking the Chernaya River valley in the north. Despite the temporary blowout in the center, most of the Soviet defenses were still solid and full of fight. Fretter-Pico decided to keep up the pressure on the weakened Soviet center, while continuing fixing attacks on the flanks. On June 14, Sanders committed part of Oberstleutnant Richard Daniel’s IR 391 from reserve to reinforce the push westward, which now included elements of two regiments each from the 72. and 170. Infanterie-Divisionen. At the forefront of this advance was Oberleutnant der Reserve Georg Bittlingmaier, commander of I./IR 391; it was unusual for a junior reserve officer to be leading an infantry battalion at this stage of the war, but Bittlingmaier was an unusual officer. No scion of Prussian gentry, Bittlingmaier had enlisted in the Reichswehr in 1921 and worked his way up to the NCO ranks. After the French campaign, he was awarded a reserve commission for his outstanding leadership qualities and then given command of a battalion in April 1942 when the previous officer was relieved. Photos show Bittlingmaier wearing a steel helmet instead of an officer’s usual soft cap, and he had a scraggly beard – here was a former NCO and “trench rat” that the troops respected and believed in. Bittlingmaier’s own 18-year-old son also served in his battalion – another rarity in the Wehrmacht.
Slowly, the Germans advanced another 1,420 yards and reached the outskirts of the town of Kadykovka by the next day. Novikov’s line was bent back sharply, and the 381st Rifle Regiment in the Blagodat State Farm was nearly encircled. Although Novikov’s troops dug in their heels on June 15, they could not maintain this front line and they lacked the resources for a major counterattack. On June 16, Novikov finally bowed to the inevitable and evacuated the farm and Rose Hill, and he pulled his forces back 1,000–1,500 yards to create a shortened line that was centered on Kadykovka. Meanwhile, Stutel’nik continued to hold on to his original frontline positions in Sector II against small-scale Romanian attacks.