Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Once the Soviets were clearly withdrawing, Manstein reorganized and retasked the component formations of AOK 11: General der Infanterie Hans von Salmuth’s XXX Armeekorps (22. and 72. Infanterie-Divisionen) would clear the Sivash coast and push toward Dzhankoy; Hansen’s battered LIV Armeekorps (50. and 132. Infanterie-Divisionen and Brigade Ziegler) would first clear the port of Yevpatoriya, then head for Sevastopol; and Generalleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck’s XXXXII Armeekorps (46., 73., and 170. Infanterie-Divisionen) would pursue the 51st Army toward Feodosiya and Kerch. Salmuth formed his own ad hoc motorized unit under Major Robert Pretz, commander of Pionier-Bataillon 22, to lead his pursuit. Kampfgruppe Pretz consisted of pioneers, light flak, and Panzerjägers. Manstein was also provided the Romanian Mountain Corps, but its forces were screening the north side of the Chongar Peninsula and were not in a position to aid a rapid pursuit into the Crimea.

Petrov’s Coastal Army fell back toward Yevpatoriya with the 25th, 95th and 321st Rifle Divisions. There were two main roads heading south from the Perekop: the road to Yevpatoriya and the road to Simferopol. Petrov split his three rifle divisions between these two routes and ordered the 42nd Cavalry Division to act as rearguard and covering force. However, the Soviet units had few motorized vehicles, and initially tried to conduct a slow, fighting withdrawal. One of only four T-34 tanks still operational, commanded by S. Borisov, conducted a single-tank delaying action, pausing to ambush the German advance units before retreating some more. Setting out from Ishun, Brigade Ziegler managed to get past Petrov’s ineffectual cavalry screens and not only get between the two roads on which Petrov’s troops were travelling, but get ahead of them by the end of October 29. Once past Petrov’s troops, Ziegler’s mixed German-Romanian force boldly pushed on to the outskirts of Simferopol on October 30, meeting negligible resistance. The main Soviet command post known as “Red Cave” had already been abandoned. The armored train Voykovets tried to fight a mobile rearguard action but was caught by Luftwaffe bombers in the Simferopol rail yard and knocked out. LIV Armeekorps was also force-marching southward, shoving Petrov’s small rearguard forces out of the way. Petrov continued marching slowly toward Simferopol, but was isolated and in danger of encirclement – if Manstein had had the LSSAH Division, the Coastal Army would have been pinned against the coast and destroyed. Yet German newsreels were already calling this “the victory march in the Crimea,” with the attitude that all that was left were mop-up actions.

Meanwhile, Batov’s broken 51st Army retreated toward the rail intersection at Dzhankoy where they hoped to link up with the 276th Rifle Division, which had been guarding the south side of the Chongar Peninsula. Although Batov tried to put up rearguards, XXX and XXXXII Armeekorps were hard on his heels and simply bowled them over before they could dig in, capturing thousands more Soviet troops in the process. A feeble effort to defend Dzhankoy failed when the 46. Infanterie-Division fought its way into the town on October 30. Aggravating Batov’s situation, Kampfgruppe Pretz was nipping at Batov’s flank along the Sivash, threatening to get ahead of the retreating Soviet divisions. After losing Dzhankoy, Batov’s retreat became a rout. South of Dzhankoy, Colonel Aleksandr I. Danilin and the rest of his staff from the 156th Rifle Division were scooped up by a patrol from the German 170. Infanterie-Division around 1100hrs. Through a Bessarabian interpreter, a German intelligence officer from LIV Armeekorps interrogated Danilin, and in return for assuring him that he would not be executed, was able to extract important details about the direction of the Soviet retreat and the confusion in the Soviet command structure after the defeat at Ishun.¹⁴ Thereafter, Danilin and his staff disappeared into German captivity, from which few survived.