Where the Iron Crosses Grow

By the evening of October 19, the 51st Army was near broken and Kuznetsov had lost control over the battle. However, the first element of the Coastal Army, Colonel Dmitri I. Tomilov’s 157th Rifle Division, was marching up from Sevastopol and would soon be available for a counterattack. Kuznetsov planned to fling the 157th Rifle Division at the 73. InfanterieDivision’s salient at Ishun, supported by the remainder of Batov’s two dismounted cavalry divisions. General-Major Ivan Y. Petrov, commander of the Coastal Army, was now subordinate to Kuznetsov but doubtless chagrined that one of his best units would be committed into action piecemeal in order to relieve the 51st Army’s situation. On the morning of October 20, two regiments of Tomilov’s 157th Rifle Division, supported by 122mm howitzer fire, attacked Ishun from the southeast while Batov’s cavalrymen attacked from the southwest. Initially, the attack went well and Bieler’s exhausted troops had their hands full trying to hold off a fresh Soviet division supported by Baranov’s T-34s. The 73. Infanterie-Division gave ground and evacuated Ishun, while conducting a fighting delay. The commander of the 2. Batterie from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, Oberleutnant Hartmann, was killed attempting to hold Ishun. However, it was now the Soviet troops who were exposed in the open, and the bombers of Fliegerkorps IV, plus Zuckertort’s artillery, mercilessly pounded Tomilov’s division. A Luftwaffe air strike found Tomilov’s command post and bombed it, wounding him and much of his staff. The Soviet attack faltered and Bieler counterattacked, retaking Ishun and pushing the 157th Rifle Division back to the river. Heavy rain then brought the day’s fighting to a close, with little change in positions. Both sides continued to hack away at each other the next day, but with no major moves.

The Stavka was shocked to find out that Kuznetsov had lost the Ishun position so quickly, and following his loss of Perekop it was clear that his skills at battle command were not up to the task of holding the Crimea. A special Stavka representative was sent to the Crimea, who relieved Kuznetsov of command on the evening of October 22. Amazingly, the Stavka decided to put the navy in charge of defending the entire Crimea, and Vice-Admiral Gordey I. Levchenko was put in command of all Soviet ground, air, and naval forces in the Crimea. For all his faults as a commander, Kuznetsov had a better understanding of the situation at Ishun than Levchenko, who had been Stavka’s naval representative at Odessa. Levchenko, who had been a crewman on the cruiser Aurora during the storming of the Winter Palace in 1917, had impeccable Soviet credentials, but had never commanded troops in ground combat before, and was not familiar with the Ishun position. Whereas Kuznetsov had recognized that the 51st Army was approaching the end of its rope, and recommended retreating to another blocking position, Levchenko dutifully followed his instructions from the Stavka to keep attacking and restore the original defensive line.

Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps was near the end of its infantry strength, so Manstein allowed his forces to temporarily shift to the tactical defense while the fresher 132. Infanterie-Division moved up to the front. Manstein had also pleaded with Heeresgruppe Süd for more help from the Luftwaffe, since Zuckertort’s artillery was running out of ammunition. Oberst Mölders sent all three of his fighter Gruppen in a sweep over the Perekop on October 23 and caught the VVS-ChF by surprise. A squadron from III./JG 52 intercepted six Pe-2 bombers and four Yak-1 fighters attacking the positions of the 46. Infanterie-Division near the Bromide Factory on Lake Krasnoe – shooting down all the bombers and three Yaks for the loss of one Bf-109. On the same day, Hauptmann Gordon Gollob claimed another three MiG-3 fighters. All told, Mölders’ fighters destroyed 23 fighters and six bombers for the loss of one of their own aircraft, effectively breaking the VVS-ChF’s control over the Perekop.¹²