Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Kuznetsov would need all the soldiers he could get to hold the position at Ishun. Although the 51st Army still had about 50,000 troops in the Crimea, he had to leave one rifle division to guard the Chongar Peninsula and other troops to watch possible crossing sites across the Sivash, leaving barely 15,000–20,000 troops to form a line at Ishun. Furthermore, many of his remaining troops were militiamen, and the cream of Batov’s 9th Rifle Corps had been eliminated in the fighting for Perekop. Oktyabrsky sent Kuznetsov two battalions of naval infantrymen from Sevastopol to reinforce the Ishun position, and the 157th Rifle Division that was the first to arrive from Odessa was en route, but Kuznetsov was short of artillery as well. The Stavka did send aerial reinforcements to the Crimea, including a squadron of the latest Yak-1 fighters for the 32nd Fighter Regiment (32 IAP) of the VVS-ChF, leading to several sharp encounters with the Bf-109s of III./JG 77.

German scouts arrived near Ishun, following in the footsteps of Kuznetsov’s retreating army; they found it to be nearly as formidable as the Perekop position. Ishun was a small town at the southern base of the Perekop Peninsula, flanked by three large salt lakes and the Black Sea. Only three mobility corridors existed between these obstacles, and the widest, between the Black Sea and Lake Staroe, where the rail line ran, was only 1,400 yards wide. The terrain was completely devoid of cover and was marshy, making movement of assault guns or other heavy weapons very difficult. Kuznetsov deployed his steadiest units, the 361st Rifle Regiment, a rifle battalion from the 172nd Rifle Division, and the two naval infantry battalions to guard this critical sector. He put the rest of the veteran 156th Rifle Division in the other potential avenue of advance between Lake Staroe and Lake Krasnoe, with a strongpoint built in a bromide factory. In order to cover his right flank, Kuznetsov deployed his 106th and 271st Rifle Divisions between Lake Krasnoe and the Sivash, even though it was a less likely avenue of approach. Indeed, throughout the fighting on the Perekop Isthmus, Kuznetsov consistently put too many forces to cover his flank on the Sivash even though Manstein had found this option impractical – the memory of the 1920 campaign now created a fear in the Red Army of being flanked. In terms of support weapons, Major Baranov still had nine T-34 tanks operational in the 5th Tank Regiment, but Kuznetsov’s artillery park was much reduced and limited to mostly older 76mm howitzers. Several improvised armored trains were being hastily assembled in Sevastopol’s workshops and the Voykovets would soon be joined by the Smyert’ fashizmu (Death to Fascism), which would provide Kuznetsov with some useful mobile firepower.

Meanwhile, following victory in the battle of the Sea of Azov, Manstein had convinced the OKH that the 11. Armee could not accomplish two divergent operational objectives, and it was decided that AOK 11 would concentrate exclusively on the Crimea, while Generaloberst Ewald von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1 continued the drive on Rostov. Unfortunately, the OKH also decided to strip AOK 11 of XXXXIX Gebirgs-Armeekorps along with the LSSAH Division, leaving Manstein with just six infantry divisions in XXX and LIV Armeekorps to conquer the Crimea. Hansen’s battered LIV Armeekorps had followed rather than pursued Kuznetsov’s 51st Army to Ishun, but was in no shape to mount a serious attack until the rest of the 11. Armee began arriving in mid-October.