Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Since tactical surprise and maneuver were impossible in this restrictive terrain, Manstein decided to surprise Kuznetsov by attacking all three avenues of approach simultaneously. However, he would begin his main effort in the east with Generalmajor Ludwig Wolff’s relatively fresh 22. Infanterie-Division, then shift his main effort to the west with Bieler’s 73. Infanterie-Division. Himer’s 46. Infanterie-Division would conduct fixing attacks in the center, to prevent Kuznetsov from shifting forces between his flanks. Zuckertort was once again in charge of the artillery preparation, but had scarcely more heavy artillery pieces or ammunition than he had at Perekop. Indeed, AOK 11’s artillery park was grossly inadequate for a deliberate attack against a fortified position such as this, forcing Manstein to depend even more heavily upon the Luftwaffe to make up the difference. In addition to more Ju-87 Stukas from StG 77, II./JG 3 and III./JG 52 were shifted to Chaplinka airfield to give Fliegerkorps IV a total of three Bf-109 Gruppen over the Perekop Isthmus. Oberst Werner Mölders, the Luftwaffe’s top-scoring pilot at this point of the war, arrived at Chaplinka to direct air operations over the Perekop. The other three divisions of the AOK 11, the 50., 72., and 170. Infanterie-Division, provided their divisional artillery and pioneer battalions to support the LIV Armeekorps attack, but otherwise were kept in reserve to exploit any breakthrough. Manstein’s only armor support was Major Hans Vogt’s Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, with about 20 StuG-IIIs, which had been returned after the Soviet defeat at Melitopol. Each of the three assault divisions in LIV Armeekorps were assigned one of Vogt’s assault-gun batteries.

At 0600hrs on October 18, Zuckertort commenced his artillery preparation. His main trump cards were a few batteries of 24cm howitzers and 30.5cm mortars, which he used to pulverize the obvious Soviet strongpoints. He directed the divisional 10.5cm and 15cm howitzers against the enemy barbed-wire obstacles and forward trenches. However, Zuckertort had no accurate long-range guns for counterbattery fire, and he had a tendency to fire small numbers of rounds at a great many targets, failing to achieve sufficient concentration to significantly disrupt the defense. After two hours of pounding away at the Soviet fieldworks and obstacle belt, Hansen’s three divisions sent their Stossgruppen forward. The biggest surprise came on the eastern flank by the Sivash, where Oberst Ernst Haccius led two battalions of his IR 65 across 490 yards of shallow water and caught the 442nd Rifle Regiment by surprise; Haccius lost a battalion commander killed and three company commanders wounded, but his regiment completely tore apart Kuznetsov’s right flank.

However, Wolff’s other regiment, Oberstleutnant Albert R. Latz’s IR 47, conducted a frontal assault across open ground against the 397th Rifle Regiment atop the Tumulus Assis burial mound. This small rise proved key terrain and Latz’s two assault battalions had to conduct a World War I-style infantry assault with predictable results. The German infantry was hopelessly channeled down a narrow mile-wide flat isthmus, with marshy lakes on both flanks. The soldiers advanced in loose formations, followed by pioneer platoons. A battery of Nebelwerfer rocket launchers laid down a smoke barrage in front of the Germans, but the Soviet machine gunners simply fired into the smoke while their battalion 82mm mortars laid down a curtain of high-explosive rounds in front of their barbed-wire obstacle belt. I./IR 47 was decimated, with its battalion commander killed and two company commanders wounded. Latz’s men were stopped cold with very heavy losses. Wolff made the mistake of reinforcing failure by sending in his reserve battalion, II./IR 16, which was also shot to pieces. He also failed to employ his assault guns to support his infantry. It had been a painful day for Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division, with 685 casualties. In the center, the 46. Infanterie-Division made modest gains against the 417th Rifle Regiment, at a cost of fewer than 200 casualties. On the western flank, IR 170 from the 73. Infanterie-Division penetrated only the outer portion of the main Soviet defensive belt between Lake Staroe and the Black Sea. During the day, Soviet counterbattery fire was quite effective, and knocked out a number of German observation posts and reconnaissance elements. Both Soviet armored trains supported the defense near Ishun with fire from their 76mm batteries. The first day was far from a success for Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps, which suffered over 1,300 casualties for only small gains.