Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Levchenko was not able to organize a large-scale counterattack until the morning of October 24, by which point his air support was gone. He decided to base his effort on Petrov’s newly arrived 25th and 95th Rifle Divisions, both heavily depleted from months of fighting at Odessa, plus the remaining combat-effective elements of the 51st Army, now led by Batov. The Soviets attacked the 73. Infanterie-Division’s positions near Ishun with massed infantry and a few T-34s, but negligible artillery support. Hansen’s frontline units were short of infantry but still had plenty of MG-34 machine-gun teams and 8cm mortar squads, which were used to shred the attacking waves. Overhead, the bombers of KG 27 wreaked havoc on the Red Army formations, and probably destroyed the armored train Smyert’ fashizmu and damaged the Voykovets. Although Petrov’s infantry courageously advanced several miles into the teeth of concentrated German firepower, they could not break the defense and the attack failed. On October 25 Levchenko ordered Petrov to attack again, but the subsequent heavy losses were too much. Sensing weakness, the Germans waited until Petrov’s troops were spent and then committed the fresh 170. Infanterie-Division into a counterattack south of Ishun. The Soviet front began to collapse, and the 170. Infanterie-Division advanced over 4 miles. Soviet command and control disintegrated as Levchenko and Batov both decided to relocate their headquarters to the south but failed to inform Petrov.

On October 26, the initiative clearly shifted back to the Germans, and Manstein released the 132. Infanterie-Division to reinforce Hansen’s push to the south. Here and there, the Soviet defenses began to fall apart, and units began retreating without orders, although others continued to cling to strongpoints. Most of Batov’s 51st Army troops were retreating in disorder before the day’s end, although Petrov had better control over his troops and began a more disciplined withdrawal toward Simferopol on his own authority. Manstein had won the battle at Ishun, but at the exorbitant cost of 7,286 casualties, including 1,515 dead or missing. When the earlier battle at Perekop is included, Manstein’s AOK 11 suffered over 12,000 casualties – equivalent to an entire division – to break through Soviet defenses on the Perekop Isthmus. However, the Soviets had little to rejoice about, since the 51st Army and Coastal Army had lost about a quarter of their strength trying to hold the Perekop positions, including 16,000 prisoners taken around Ishun. Batov’s retreating 51st Army had very little remaining combat power, particularly after the loss of about 200 artillery pieces. Petrov’s Coastal Army was in better shape, since it arrived only in the later stages of the fighting for the Perekop, but it still lost 28,000 of its 80,000 troops.

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Manstein had intended to conduct his pursuit with the LSSAH Division, but since this unit was no longer under his command, he had to improvise. He formed a scratch motorized unit known as Brigade Ziegler under Oberst Heinz Ziegler, the chief of staff of XXXXII Armeekorps, to spearhead the pursuit of the defeated Soviet Coastal Army. AOK 11 provided Oberstleutnant Oskar von Boddien’s Aufklärungs-Abteilung 22, Major Vogt’s Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, two bicycle-mounted reconnaissance companies, some motorized flak guns, and the army-level Panzerjäger-Abteilung 560 (equipped with 3.7cm Pak), but AOK 11 was surprisingly short of trucks due to heavy losses from Soviet air and artillery attacks in the crowded Perekop Isthmus. Instead, a good portion of the ad hoc brigade was composed of Romanian motorized cavalrymen from Colonel Radu Korné’s 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment.¹³ Korné was one of the few Romanian tactical leaders who had impressed the Germans in the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, and he was known for aggressive and rapid advances. Ziegler was instructed to push hard on Petrov’s heels in an effort to keep the Soviets on the run so that they did not stop to form a new line of resistance, but he clearly would not be able to capture a city such as Sevastopol with 2,000 lightly equipped motorized troops.