Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Stalin and Mekhlis wanted Kozlov to attack and retake the Crimea by mid-February, but this was simply not possible, as the logistical situation in the Kerch Peninsula was still quite rudimentary, since preference had been given to combat units moving across the straits, not service-support units. Three regiments of 76mm USV guns had arrived without any ammunition and food was in very short supply for the Crimean Front. The transportation network in the Kerch Peninsula was primitive, and heavy rains made the dirt roads impassible to traverse even for Soviet trucks. After the recapture of Feodosiya, the Luftwaffe shifted its focus to battlefield interdiction, and began bombing Kerch’s port facilities and regularly sinking cargo ships crossing from Novorossiysk. Consequently, Kozlov was not able assemble a combat-ready force of five rifle divisions in the 51st Army and four rifle divisions in the 44th Army until late February.

Kozlov decided to make his main effort with Lvov’s 51st Army in the northern part of the Parpach Narrows, in the area between Koi-Asan and the Sivash. This area, roughly 5½ miles wide by 6 miles deep, was a flat, grassy steppe with no significant elevations, and would become the most fought-over terrain in the Crimea for the next three months. Aside from a handful of small villages in this area, there was very little cover and concealment, which made any kind of movement susceptible to artillery and air attacks. The Germans built Stützpunkt (strongpoints) in the villages of Tulumchak, Korpech’, and Koi-Asan. Mattenklott’s XXXXII Armeekorps held this area with General Nicolae Costescu’s Romanian 18th Infantry Division and Himer’s 46. Infanterie-Division, while the 132. Infanterie-Division held the southern end of the Axis line. Gruppe Hitzfeld was in reserve. This was excellent defensive terrain, and the narrowness of the front enabled Mattenklott and Fetter-Pico to establish defensive positions in accordance with German doctrinal norms; unlike other places on the Eastern Front, where German divisions were required to hold 12–15 miles of front line, here a division was required to hold only a 2–4-mile-wide front. Yet both sides made costly mistakes at the Parpach Narrows. The Germans chose to hold on to a salient jutting out from the Koi-Asan position and required the Romanian 18th Infantry Regiment to defend an exposed position in the north, along the Sivash. Soviet offensive planning was made with very little regard for terrain or weather, which was atrocious in late February. Unlike other parts of the Eastern Front, which were still receiving large snow storms, the warmer Crimea received less snow but far heavier soaking rains, which lasted for days.

At 0630hrs on February 27, 1942, Kozlov began his first offensive, beginning with an artillery preparation from about 230 artillery pieces, although the vast majority were lightweight 76mm guns. The German strongpoints, usually reinforced with stones from nearby rock quarries, were not damaged much by 76mm high-explosive rounds, and Kozlov’s heavy artillery was limited to just 30 122mm howitzers. Nor did he have any long-range guns for counterbattery work to suppress the German artillery. Nevertheless, when Kozlov committed his armor against two battalions of the Romanian 18th Infantry Regiment, they achieved quick success. Despite heavy rains that made the low-lying ground too soft for his battalion of KV-1 heavy tanks to advance, the lighter T-26 tanks moved forward and overran the Stützpunkt at Tulumchak. The Romanian infantry regiment was routed, opening up the northern end of the Axis defensive line. A German artillery battalion, supporting the Romanians, was overrun and lost all 18 of its 10.5cm l.FH 18 howitzers, as well as 14 3.7cm Pak guns.²⁶ Kozlov’s armor and infantry were able to advance 2½ miles on the first day of the offensive, until Gruppe Hitzfeld was rushed up to halt them. Thereafter, the Soviet assault units were blocked by marshy terrain and determined German infantry, preventing any further advance. The stalled Soviet tanks and infantry were then exposed to persistent artillery and antitank fire, which eroded their numbers. Although Kozlov had attached sappers to his armor units, they had fallen behind, and seven Soviet tanks were knocked out by German Teller antitank mines near Stützpunkt Tulumchak. On the left flank of the Soviet penetration Stützpunkt Korpech’ remained in German hands, and its machine guns and mortars concentrated on anything moving upright in the open terrain. The Soviet assault literally bogged down. The ground near the Sivash was so waterlogged, with large standing puddles of water, that Soviet troops could not even lay prone in some places. The Axis defense was also undermined by the lack of air support; the Luftwaffe managed only three sorties over the battle area on the first day, against over 100 sorties from the VVS-Crimean Front.